McCloy Symposium: Lael Weis on Why Political Communication Isn’t an Individual Right in Australia

By Dr Lael Weis

McCloy Case Page

Much of the commentary about McCloy, the High Court’s recent decision upholding NSW’s ban on donations by property developers, will concern the disagreement among members of the Court about the appropriate method for analysing burdens on the freedom of political communication, and I will look forward to what my colleagues have to say. My own contribution to the blog symposium on this case focuses on a long-standing consensus point: namely, the idea that the freedom is not an ‘individual right’.

Although I imagine members of the public might feel somewhat scandalized if told the right of individuals to communicate political matters is a fake idea in Australia, this is something the Court seems firmly committed to. Each of the four judgments in McCloy affirms this proposition: at [29]–[30] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, and Keane JJ); at [119]–[120] (Gageler J); at [219] (Nettle J); at [316]–[319] (Gordon J).

This was also a consensus theme in Unions NSW [2013] HCA 58, the antecedent to McCloy that struck down a wider NSW ban on political contributions by people who are not on the electoral role, such as corporations and unions. In a joint judgment Continue reading

Tajjour v State of New South Wales; Hawthorne v State of New South Wales; Forster v State of New South Wales

The High Court has held that s 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) is not invalid. That section makes it an offence for a person to continue to ‘habitually consort’ with convicted offenders after receiving an ‘official warning’, either verbally or in writing, from a police officer. Continue reading

Freedom to Preach in Rundle Mall: Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (‘Corneloup’s Case’)

By Professor Adrienne Stone

Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide Case Page

Two weeks ago, the Federal Court dismissed a challenge by members of Occupy Melbourne against the enforcement of bans on camping and advertising in inner Melbourne’s squares and gardens. Justice North relied in large part on a High Court ruling from March, concerning Samuel Corneloup and his brother Caleb, members of a street church that regularly engaged in preaching on the Rundle Mall in Adelaide. Their noisy preaching gave rise to one of two important freedom of political communication cases in the High Court this year: Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide [2013] HCA 3 (‘Corneloups Case’). (The other, Monis v The Queen [2013] HCA 4, is discussed here.)

Adelaide’s preaching ban
Preaching on the Adelaide mall (like other ‘roads’) is subject to Council By-Law No 4 which (subject to exceptions for election campaigning) provides that ‘[n]o person shall without permission on any road

2.3       preach, canvass, harangue, tout for business or conduct any survey or opinion poll …

2.8       give out or distribute to any bystander or passer-by any handbill, book, notice, or other printed matter.

Disputes arose between the Corneloup brothers and the Adelaide City Council over the Corneloups’ preaching that resulted, first, in the conviction of Samuel Corneloup in the Magistrates Court of South Australia in 2010 and, second, in separate proceedings brought by the Council to restrain the Corneloups and others from preaching on the Rundle Mall. Continue reading

News: Split High Court judgment may complicate Skype scandal verdict

Yesterday, the highly publicised ‘Skype scandal’ within the Australian Defence Force Academy yielded a guilty verdict against two cadets accused of broadcasting otherwise consensual sex on Skype without the knowledge of one of the participants. However, a rare split High Court decision on a constitutional point from earlier this year — Monis v Queen; Droudis v Queen [2013] HCA 4 — discussed by Professor Adrienne Stone on this blog in April, looms over part of the verdict. Continue reading