AUSTRALASIAN POSTGRADUATE PHILOSOPHY CONFERENCE

CONFERENCE BOOKLET

October 4th - 6th, 2013

Hosted by
The Postgraduate Philosophy Group
School of Historical and Philosophical Studies
University of Melbourne

The Conference will take place at Parkville Campus, University of Melbourne
Campus maps: http://www.unimelb.edu.au/campuses/maps.html
Organizing Committee

Cristian Soto, Program Convenor, Ph.D. in Philosophy Student, University of Melbourne

Marilyn Stendera, Ph.D. in Philosophy Student, University of Melbourne

Tim Newton-Howes, Master in Philosophy Student, University of Melbourne

Ariel Kruger, Master in Philosophy Student, University of Melbourne

Tristram Oliver Skuse, Ph.D. in Philosophy Student, University of Melbourne

Severin Staalesen, Master in Philosophy Student, University of Melbourne

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Dr. Dana Goswick, Philosophy Postgraduate Coordinator, University of Melbourne

Sarah Gloger, Research Higher Degree Support Officer, University of Melbourne

Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Melbourne

Professor Mark Colyvan, University of Sydney

Professor James Franklin, University of New South Wales

Professor Daniel Nolan, Australian National University

Professor Stewart Candlish, University of Western Australia, Editor of Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Australasian Association of Philosophy
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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Old Arts Building, Theatre A</th>
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<th>Babel Building, Room G03 (Lower Theatrette)</th>
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</table>
| 10:00 - 10:50 | Ross Barham (University of Melbourne)  
The concept of objectivity | David Kinkead (University of Queensland)  
An attempt to solve the boundary problem | Doug McConnell (Macquarie University)  
Fatalistic stories: narrative motivation and addiction | Sidney Diamante (De La Salle University)  
Can there be time for prayers? |
| 11:00 - 11:50 | Salman Panahy (University of Melbourne)  
The justification of deduction. A proof-theoretic approach | Evie Kendal (Monash University)  
Equal opportunity and the case for state sponsored ectogenesis in Australia: a feminist perspective | Mark Saward (Monash University)  
How not to make a fine-tuning argument | Anoop George (Indian Institute of Technology)  
Modernity, technology, and nihilism: Heidegger on the devaluation of the uppermost values |
| 11:50 - 12:20 | Morning tea and coffee (Old Arts Building, Atrium Room 213) |
| 12:20 - 1:10 | Daniel Wee (University of Otago)  
Does rule following necessarily require rejecting Platonism? | Duncan Martin (Victoria University of Wellington)  
Moral exemplars and ecological attitudes | Mark Winstanley (HPS, University of Melbourne)  
Between social norm and individual necessity - how genetic epistemology unifies the Janus faces logic | Andrew John Cantwell (La Trobe University)  
Schopenhauer: an evaluation of his theory of will |
| 1:10 - 2:00 | Lunch |
| 2:00 - 2:50 | Bruce Long (University of Sydney)  
Platonic structures cannot be informational | Robyn Kath (University of Sydney)  
Procreation is risky (and therefore wrong) | Adam Tuszyński (University of Warsaw)  
Introduction to the group-mind theory of the theory of agency | Xavier Symons (University of Sydney)  
Rethinking cognition: a Thomistic account of intentionality |
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<th>Time</th>
<th>Speaker 1</th>
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<td>3:00 - 3:50</td>
<td>Jane McDonnell (Monash University)</td>
<td><em>Is mathematics unreasonably effective in the natural sciences?</em></td>
<td>Daniel Nellor (University of Melbourne)</td>
<td><em>The relationship between morality and politics in the works of Raimond Gaita</em></td>
<td>Severin Staalesen (University of Melbourne)</td>
<td><em>Multiple realisation and the metaphysics of disunity: a response to Kim</em></td>
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<td>Monty de la Torre (Australian Catholic University)</td>
<td><em>What is the human person? Personhood and the right to life in Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics</em></td>
<td>Marissa Hardwick (University of Tasmania)</td>
<td><em>Context and content: a rejection of phenomenal ultimates</em></td>
<td>Jose Lezama (University of Adelaide)</td>
<td><em>Is moral education still possible?</em></td>
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<td>Raphael Fiorese (Monash University)</td>
<td><em>Stoljar's dilemma and three conceptions of the physical: a defence of the via negativa</em></td>
<td>David Chua (University of Sydney)</td>
<td><em>The problem of knowledge and Thomas Aquinas' account of scientia</em></td>
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<td>5:20 - 6:20</td>
<td>Keynote Speaker: Prof. Mark Colyvan</td>
<td><em>The ins and outs of mathematical explanation</em></td>
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### Saturday, October the 5th

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<td>9:00 - 9:50</td>
<td>Alexander Gillett</td>
<td>Saranga Sudarshian</td>
<td>Russell McPhee</td>
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<td>(University of West England)</td>
<td>(Sydney University)</td>
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<td>(La Trobe University)</td>
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<td>Naturalistic metaphysics:</td>
<td>Luck-egalitarianism and</td>
<td>A reply to situationist attacks on</td>
<td>Subjectivity and the Other: the founding</td>
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<td>10:00 - 10:50</td>
<td>Ariel Kruger</td>
<td>Sebastian Schneider</td>
<td>Szu-Yen Lin</td>
<td>Wojciech Kaftanski</td>
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<td>Toward necessary conditions</td>
<td>Rethinking the concept of</td>
<td>Work-meaning and context</td>
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<td>11:10 - 12:00</td>
<td>Cristian Soto</td>
<td>Wendy Carlton</td>
<td>Laurence Waugh</td>
<td>Aaron Harrison</td>
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<td>A structural realist approach</td>
<td>Appropriating the past</td>
<td>An answer to the trolley problem</td>
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<td>to laws of nature</td>
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<td>Wittgenstein and phenomenology</td>
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<td>Tessa Jones (Monash University)</td>
<td>Kate Lowry (Monash University)</td>
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<td>The constitution of composite objects</td>
<td>Epicurus on politics</td>
<td>Valerijs Vinogradovs (La Trobe University)</td>
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<td>Kelly Hamilton (Macquarie University)</td>
<td>Lack of productive imagination in Sellars’ appropriation of Kantian imagination</td>
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<td>3:00 - 3:50</td>
<td>Paul Daniels (Monash University)</td>
<td>Mirjam van der Heide (University of Western Sydney)</td>
<td>Dignity and normative critique</td>
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<td>Why “sweeping” endurantism is a mischaracterization of endurantism?</td>
<td>Renee England (University of Queensland)</td>
<td>Marilyn Stendera (University of Melbourne)</td>
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<td>4:00 - 4:50</td>
<td>Sarah-Jane Dempsey (Monash University)</td>
<td>David Rowe (La Trobe University)</td>
<td>Simon Varey (University of Sydney)</td>
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<td>The dynamic present: not yet an ontology of the past</td>
<td>Skepticism about moral judgment internalism</td>
<td>A conceptual analysis of irony</td>
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<td>Kathrine Cuccuru (University College, London)</td>
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<td>Feeling the sublime in Shaftesbury’s account of the beautiful</td>
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<td>Prof. James Franklin (University of New South Wales)</td>
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<td>Australian philosophy: whence it came, where it went</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:00 - 10:50</td>
<td>Ross Pain (La Trobe University) <em>Naïve realism, representationalism, and the two component</em></td>
<td>Liam Moore (Monash University) <em>Ethical wolves, or what the pragmatic-virtue ethicists can learn from situationism</em></td>
<td>Matthew Macdonald (Victoria University of Wellington) <em>Intuition and contradiction</em></td>
<td>Brook Novak (La Trobe University) <em>Dissolution of the hand: pragmatism and digital fabrication of technologies</em></td>
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<td>11:00 - 11:50</td>
<td>Stephanie Rennick (Macquarie University/University of Glasgow) <em>Why foreknowledge does not always entail problematic predestination?</em></td>
<td>Robert Ralston (University of Adelaide) <em>An investigation into the social intuitionist claims about the formation of moral judgments; what do the rare cases suggests?</em></td>
<td>Chung-Chen Soong (University of Auckland) <em>Understanding Kendall Walton in the dream</em></td>
<td>William Hebblewhite (La Trobe University) <em>The concept of anonymity</em></td>
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<td>12:10 - 1:00</td>
<td>Prof. Stewart Candlish (University of Western Australia / Editor Australasian Journal of Philosophy) <em>How to get published in philosophy</em></td>
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<td>2:00 - 2:50</td>
<td>Andrea Marcelli (La Trobe University) <em>Understanding informative clues: language change and belief revision</em></td>
<td>Dominic Lenzi (University of Melbourne) <em>The virtue of care for nature</em></td>
<td>Paul Barry (La Trobe University) <em>Schizophrenia and the virtues of self-effacement</em></td>
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<td>3:00 - 3:50</td>
<td>Lok-Chi Chan (University of Sydney) <em>Langton’s argument from modal intuition to epistemic humility</em></td>
<td>Julian Koplin (Monash University) <em>The burden of proof in bioethical debates</em></td>
<td>Ryoji Sato (Monash University) <em>The 'apparent' richness of visual experience and theories of consciousness</em></td>
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The Concept of Objectivity

Following Donald Davidson’s suggestion that instead of trying to fend off global scepticism by justify our belief in the existence of a mind-independent reality, we should inquire as to how it is that we came to have such a notion at all, I explore a small number of thought-experiments (some original) that suggest that language is non-trivially essential to our higher-order concept of objectivity.

Schizophrenia and the Virtues of Self-Effacement

Michael Stocker thinks that consequentialism and deontological ethics bring about a divided or ‘schizophrenic’ self, due to the self-effacingness of those theories. His argument is often thought to encourage the adoption of a virtue ethical position. But Simon Keller says that this is a mistake. He argues that virtue ethics is self-effacing in the same way that consequentialism and deontological theories are, so if Stocker’s argument really does cause a problem for those theories, then it equally causes a problem for virtue ethicists.

This paper argues against this claim. The argument comes in two parts. I first consider the self-effacement involved in the acquisition and display of virtue, and argue that this differs from the schizophrenia that Stocker has in mind. I follow others in viewing the acquisition of virtue as like that of a practical skill, and aim to show that the display of virtue does not result in the divided self that Stocker thinks comes about when one tries to follow a consequentialist or a deontological ethic. I then consider the question of whether virtue ethics itself is self-effacing in that the basic moral reasons to which it is committed are ones that it says agents should not be moved by. I argue that virtue ethics need not be self-effacing in this way, since the virtuous ethicist can recognise as basic the reasons to which one is responsive when acting virtuously. I follow Keller in considering a de re reading of a virtue ethical criterion of right action, and argue that such a reading allows the virtue ethicist, but not the consequentialist, to avoid self-effacement.
The aims of this paper are twofold: firstly, to give the reader a comprehensive understanding of Schopenhauer's theory of will, and, secondly, to elucidate certain problems inherent in this theory. Schopenhauer's epistemology, dual aspect ontology, aesthetics, ethics, and pessimism will be examined. Additionally, a cursory exposition of Kant's metaphysics will be presented, along with Schopenhauer's critique of this. Possible solutions to problems in his theory will be expounded and subsequently critiqued. Most salient of these problems is his identification of the will with the Kantian thing-in-itself. I argue that Schopenhauer's theory of will contradicts the Kantian confines on metaphysical knowledge. Consequently, and in light of his own epistemology, there are serious, if not intractable, problems with his contentions that the will is the Kantian thing-in-itself, and it is knowable.

One issue that has frustrated narrative accounts of personal identity is the inability to articulate the finer detail of how narrative capacities actually work. Recognising that traits, beliefs, values, capacities, and social circumstances change over time, it is clear that not all past experiences accessed in autobiographical memory are readily incorporated into a functionally coherent self-narrative. Sorting out how a person can view herself as the same person she used to be, despite change, is far from straightforward. In this paper I critique Marya Schechtman’s concept of “empathic access.” Schechtman sets out to describe the conditions necessary for an identity-preserving relation between a present and past person. Locating problematic aspects of her account will yield insights for developing an alternative account of our appropriation of autobiographical memories and the role that narration takes in past-directed reflection.

I present the main features of the concept of empathic access and discuss three philosophical influences that seem to pervade her theory. They are: the various personal identity theorists against whom Schechtman attempts to position her theory, a strong reading of Harry Frankfurt’s concept of identification, and an adherence to Richard Wollheim's account of centred and acentred memory. I will discuss why these influences have not lent appropriate conceptual
frameworks to the task at hand. Ultimately, Schechtman succumbs to an atomistic view of the psychological life of persons, a view that she initially set out to resist in her own Narrative Self-constitution View. I believe that a different framing of the relation between self and autobiographic memory is required. The language of identity needs to be replaced by continuity and any articulation of the relation between the self and the past needs to capture the *agential* aspects of remembering that are endowed by the narrative structure of our past-directed self-reflection.

Abstract: In this paper, I critically examine Rae Langton’s Kantian argument from modal intuition for epistemic humility. Langton argues that causal powers are irreducible to the intrinsic properties of substances, i.e., laws of nature must be external. The argument rests on at least two basic assumptions: (1) A transworld identity of two properties regardless of their different theoretical roles is possible, and (2) our intuition that the same substances can behave causally different in other possible world is correct. She concludes that we cannot have knowledge of the ‘absolute intrinsic properties’ of the substance. I argue that the argument does not sound even if the two assumptions is correct. I present a new possible model of laws of nature which is different from the two classical ones, i.e. the ‘cosmic lawmaker’ model and the reductionist model. The new model shows that Langton commits a false dilemma. I then examine the possible modified argument for epistemic humility that we cannot have knowledge of ‘intrinsic properties’ because we cannot determine which model is true. I argue that this is not necessarily the case.

David Chua
University of Sydney, Australia

The Problem of Knowledge and Thomas Aquinas’ Account of Scientia

I take the problem of knowledge (or one such problem) to be the *sceptical* problem posed by Descartes: an argument with apparently true premises, which entails that we don’t have any knowledge of the external world. It is often agreed that a substantive solution to the problem of knowledge requires (i) an explanation of which premises of the sceptical argument to reject, and (ii) why the false premises *appear* to be true, and hence why there is an *apparent* paradox. In this paper I investigate various elements of Thomas Aquinas’ account of perception and knowledge, with an eye towards evaluating whether his account is capable of offering a substantive solution to the sceptical problem.
Feeling the Sublime in Shaftesbury's account of the Beautiful.

In 'Aesthetic Experience in Shaftesbury' (2002) Richard Glauser offers a plausible and compelling account of (as the name suggests) aesthetic experience in Shaftesbury. Glauser takes aesthetic experience to be "an experience through which beauty is apprehended and appreciated". His exposition rightly concentrates on Shaftesbury's account of the natural disposition to apprehend beauty, i.e. what makes a subject capable of apprehending the form of beauty; and, the formal objects of aesthetic experience, i.e. what is apprehended. However, I suggest Glauser does not fully address, or at the very least does not make explicit, the nature of the subject's affective response to the beautiful, i.e. what it feels like to experience beauty. Most significantly, I shall demonstrate that Shaftesbury understands this affective response to be the sublime.

So in this paper I shall examine and extend Glauser's account to encompass the phenomenal features of the affective response to beauty as seen in Shaftesbury. In particular I shall concentrate on Glauser's discussion of what is described by Shaftesbury as 'positive enthusiasm' and its relation to the 'first view' of a beautiful object. I shall flesh out this notion to fully capture Shaftesbury's sense of what it feels like to experience beauty. Diverging from Glauser, I show that Shaftesbury would call this feeling the sublime. I argue that there are two reasons to understand Shaftesbury in this way. Firstly, there is supporting textual evidence in his major works; and secondly, the salient phenomenal features of the affective response from Shaftesbury's account correspond with those described in his contemporaries' accounts of the sublime. This will go toward demonstrating the plausibility of the broader claim that early-eighteenth century accounts of aesthetic experience tend to hold that the sublime is the affective response to beautiful objects.

Why "Sweeping" Endurantism is a Mischaracterization of Endurantism

I argue against a certain characterization of endurantism commonly found in the literature—one where enduring objects are said to persist by "sweeping" through time. I argue that there are a number of reasons—including ones from time travel, Parfitian teleportation, and compatibility with eternalism—why the endurantist should not characterize her view as one where objects could, in any sense, persist by "sweeping" or "moving" through time. It is instead the case that enduring objects persist by being multiply wholly located at each time at which they exist (in such a way that doesn't entail any claims about "sweeping" or "moving" through time).

Monty De La Torre
Australian Catholic University, Australia

What is the Human Person? Personhood and the Right to Life in Aristotelian-Thomistic Metaphysics

The question concerning the personhood and right to life of human beings and in particular, the zygote or fetus, is of a metaphysical nature. The study of metaphysics seeks to understand the first principles of being, i.e. the origin and causes of all reality. In this way, arriving at the origins of what it is to be a person and the causes and modes of a person’s being and the consequences of that existence requires a metaphysical answer. The following essay will present an account of the human person and its right to life from the moment of conception based on Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics, including answering some commonly held arguments against the foregoing position.

Sarah-Jane Dempsey

Monash University, Australia

The Dynamic Present: Not yet an Ontology of the Past

In this paper I introduce the key theory of my PhD thesis. I argue that time is asymmetrical and involves passage and suggest a new model to explain this functionality. The model which I call the Proto Model is a branching structure of uninstantiated properties with a unique present. This paper discusses a number of its features, from how to conceptualise branching, to different types of time in the model, to how time actually passes in this model. The model acknowledges and neutralises some of the objections to passage theories and, I contend, provides a more suitable candidate for a dynamic temporal structure. The purpose of the thesis is to demonstrate that passage is not necessarily ‘an ontology of the past’.

Sidney Diamante

De La Salle University, Philippines

Can There Be Time for Prayers?

Some belief traditions that are based on the concept of an omniscient God claim that petitionary prayer is causally efficacious, i.e. that it is possible to influence God to act in such a way that he would not act had the prayer not been offered. In this paper, I argue that petitionary prayer cannot be efficacious, given the metaphysics of time. The truth of either the A-theory or the B-theory of time inevitably renders prayer redundant or futile.
Together with God’s omniscience, a B-theory construal of time results in a deterministic universe, which quite obviously renders prayer metaphysically useless. What about an A-theory construal? If the future is not yet real, can prayer have any influence on what it will be like?

Petitionary prayer has the goal of bringing about a desired future state of affairs. I will demonstrate that despite its future-directed appearance, petitionary prayer actually involves changing or bringing about the past—a phenomenon that will be treated as an impossibility.

It is often supposed by believers that if petitionary prayer were efficacious, then future states of affairs are not fixed. Is this actually the case? I argue that God’s omniscience prevents the possibility of an open future.

Renee England
University of Queensland, Australia

Emotion in Agency – Insights from Kristjánsson’s Emotion-Based Self

Emotion has remained on the periphery of mainstream Anglo-American philosophical discussions of agency because modern liberal discourse is dominated by two underlying conceptions of the self in which emotions are peripheral, namely the Kantian ethical subject and homo economicus, the self of instrumental rationality. However, since these views of the self have been subject to sustained criticism from numerous perspectives for failing to account for the significance of things such as the body, social and political environments and the emotions, various new notions of the self have been posited. These reconstruals have in turn opened up new ways of understanding agency with significant scope for identifying positive and substantive contributions from emotion. One such reconstrual is Kristján Kristjánsson’s emotion-based self; it points to roles for emotion in providing a necessary affective foundation for agency, constituting the efficient causes for much human action and bridging the “gap” between moral reasoning and moral action. Nonetheless, while Kristjánsson challenges the mentalism and individualism of the liberal tradition by denying an emotion-cognition split and making socially constituted emotional activity central to the self, his descriptions of the mature, independent self and of the way emotions bridge the “gap” between moral reasoning and moral action both demonstrate the continued effects of these problematic influences. Specifically, cognition remains crucially separate from the emotion-based core of the self and maturity and independence are ultimately guaranteed by rational capacities and social isolation. I argue that effectively challenging the emotion-cognition split entails that a self produced by emotional activity is necessarily cognitively constituted as well, and that the relational scaffolding of both emotion and cognition further necessitates this self, and its mature independence, are also socially constituted. The contributions of emotion to agency indicated by Kristjánsson’s self thus require further development in light of these considerations.
As a first pass, physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical. But what does it mean to say that everything is physical? In his recent book, *Physicalism*, Daniel Stoljar puts forwards a dilemma to the effect that no account of the physical is available which allows for a formulation of physicalism that is both possibly true and deserving of the name. As against this claim, I argue that the so-called via negativa – roughly, the idea that the physical is to be characterised in terms of the non-mental – provides just such an account. Indeed, if my argument is sound, the via negativa is the only conception of the physical which can account for our various intuitions regarding the conditions under which physicalism holds. To say that everything is physical, then, is to say that nothing is fundamentally mental.

Heidegger has very closely analyzed the important and most influential philosophical discussion on the problem of nihilism. The advent of modernity opened up a vista towards the future where even the highest values seem valueless. What Heidegger highlights most in this age of devaluation is that there is a complete collapse of the ground of being or the abandonment of the beings by being, and in this process all highest values are made valueless and what remains is a brute force towards ‘will to power’. The collapse of the uppermost values forces other values to emerge, but they soon seem to draw the lines of destruction. Heidegger takes the discussion further suggesting that the positing of the uppermost values, their falsification, devaluation and deposition, an urge to replace old values with the new ones are all a drive towards a form of “pessimism”. Today modernity with the essence of technology and enframing try to establish an absolute dominion over the earth. We achieve this through the calculative ‘positing’ and ‘unpositing’ of values. In this way the authority of the values itself cease to exist. Setting our mind merely on things of value we fail to comprehend the object in its authentic being. This sets in the problem of representationalism and gradually comes to a rigorous reductionism. Hence this paper while addressing the modern form of valuelessness, will also try to propose the only truly subversive possibility; as held by Heidegger, a thoroughly and deeply critical thinking of development that challenges the ‘common senses’ of modernity.
This paper aims to give an overview of a number of interconnecting issues around naturalism, scientific realism and metaphysics, which hinge upon the nature of mathematics. It shall be argued that the metaphysical problem of nature requires a necessary engagement with science given the extraordinary success of the latter. In turn, it will be reciprocally argued that science has an implicit metaphysics. The purpose of explicating this is a naturalistic metaphysics – following the work of Ladyman and Ross (2007). Outlining this position involves debates in the philosophy of science – specifically [a] anti-realist arguments from the history of science and [b] metaphysical underdetermination problems in fundamental physics. These debates entail a sophisticated form of scientific realism called “structural realism”. This paper will examine the issues that arise from adopting this position and its relation to naturalism. These issues centre on philosophical aspects of mathematics; such as: [i] the “indispensable” role of mathematics for science (Bangu 2012), [ii] the applicability of mathematics to nature (also known as the “Wigner Puzzle” (Colyvan 2001)), and [iii] the potential “blurring” of the mathematical and the physical in scientific representation and modelling (French & Ladyman 2003). It shall be argued that a more speculative, rather than austere, metaphysical naturalism is needed to tackle these issues in a sufficiently philosophically robust enough manner.

Kelly Hamilton

Macquarie University, Australia

Can there be collective emotions?

In our everyday talk, we speak of groups having emotions. We talk of a community being gripped by fear, or sports fans being outraged by a referee decision. Despite this talk, there is a strong intuition that emotions are the kind of phenomena that only individuals can experience. The question arises: how can groups have emotions? One reply is that emotions can be distributed, so that when we say that a group has an emotion, we simply mean that many individuals happen to feel the same emotion. In this paper, I will explore three accounts of collective emotion, to determine if there is a more interesting way to understand the notion of collective emotion.

Bryce Huebner (2011) puts forward an account of emotion as representational mental states, and argues that collectives are capable of having representational states and thus can have emotions. Margaret Gilbert (2002) argues for a plural-subject account of collective guilt. She argues that individuals can be jointly committed to
feeling guilt about their own group’s actions. Huebner and Gilbert both deny the importance of the phenomenology of emotions, thus making collective emotions quite different from personal emotions.

Hans Bernard Schmid (2009) argues for a phenomenological account of collective grief. He argues that what makes the experience of grief collective is the shared subject: many individuals may identify with one another and feel the grief as a “we.”

These three accounts tackle the problem of collective emotions in different ways. I will analyse each account, showing how each fits with our intuitions about what an emotion is. In doing so, I will argue for the importance of the phenomenology of emotions and try to understand how this does not force us to immediately abandon the notion that emotions can be collective.

Marissa Hardwick
University of Tasmania, Australia

Context and Content: A Rejection of Phenomenal Ultimates

Some philosophers argue that the richness of conscious experience demands a unique ontology, claiming that its phenomenal content cannot be integrated into a physicalist view of the world. They claim that the experience that we enjoy consists of simpler, prototypical parts that together compose the whole. These parts are termed phenomenal ultimates.

Critics respond that we don’t need these additional entities, but what the theories employing phenomenal ultimates most deeply neglect is the relevance of physical context for the very phenomenality that they describe as prototypical. The experiential element is taken to be a standalone feature of nature, and in this move it is extracted from the physical, biological, and cultural conditions that bring it to life.

Since theories of phenomenal ultimates often cite a perceived failure of the physicalist project, I will address these theories through a defence of that project. I will take physical context to exert a direct influence over phenomenology, and in doing so deliver an argument against phenomenal ultimates. I will examine the most highly-regarded theories of phenomenal ultimates—neutral monism and naturalistic dualism—as elucidated by Sam Coleman (2012, 2013) and David Chalmers (1996, forthcoming) respectively.

My response is twofold: I will draw upon Philip Goff (2006, 2009), Daniel Stoljar (2002, 2007), Fiona Macpherson (2012), and William James’ (1890) mind-dust objection to address the finer faults of theories involving phenomenal ultimates. From the discussion of these shortfalls, I will then construct an argument from Van Cleve (1990), Patricia Churchland (1996), Paul Churchland (1985), Neil Campbell (2000), and Clyde Hardin (1987, 1988) to highlight the direct influence of the physical environment and conditions upon conscious experience. I conclude that theories of phenomenal ultimates display a problematic ontological trend in their favour of content over context.
The Rejection of Pure Sensation in Wittgenstein and Phenomenology

Comparative investigations into the relation of Wittgenstein and phenomenology often recognise the resemblance between Wittgenstein's criticisms of a certain picture of perceptual experience (exemplified in sense-data theories), and phenomenological strategies against what Merleau-Ponty called 'pure' sensation. The same comparative investigations are frequently frustratingly short on the details of this particular aspect of the relation. To remedy this, I distinguish between two possible strains or sub-fallacies of the fallacy that Wittgenstein and the phenomenologists diagnose: 1) objectification, the tendency to treat as an object what is not an object; and 2) materialisation, the tendency to treat as physical or material what is not physical or material. There is evidence for both in Wittgenstein's middle and later work, and in the arguments and descriptions of the phenomenologists. An examination of the characteristics, interplay and relative priority of the two sub-fallacies leads quickly to a general comparison of the different party's conceptions of philosophical reflection.

William Hebblewhite
La Trobe University, Australia

The Concept of Anonymity

In this paper we will contest this portrayal of anonymity and the moral standing of those who actively engage in anonymous acts on the Internet. Here we will not be defending cruel or immoral actions, but rather, point out two flaws in the sweeping dismissal of anonymity. The first is that in this era of technology to be truly anonymous is harder than ever. Even those in possession of Glaucon's ring would be hard pressed to get away with any crime; fingerprints, motion detectors, and the like, all virtually negate the rings power of being invisible. On the Internet were all actively is logged and catalogued true anonymity even harder to achieve. Secondly, what those applying Plato's point against anonymity to the modern context fail to realise is that being anonymous on the Internet is not a special or unique thing. When in an anonymous chat room then all people in that chat room are anonymous, it is not like there is one person with a ring that marks them as distinct from others. Fascinatingly, we will show that social rules and norms have actually been formed to help regulate such situations. An excellent example of this is the rules, or rather guidelines, that are associated with one of the most notorious anonymous chat rooms the /b/. By illustrating how social interactions does not collapse in cases of anonymous interaction we will show why this doomsday account of anonymity does not apply and in fact, why anonymity should, to some extent, be encouraged.
Dignity is often used as a form of normative critique in political struggles, for example by the Indignados movement in Spain and by the protesters during the Arab Spring, but in order for these forms of critique to be widely recognised, there has to be some agreement on the meaning of the term dignity. However, there is no consensus among scholars on the meaning of dignity, and many critics dismiss the concept as vague or rhetorical. In his article Dignity’s Gauntlet Remy Debes tries to develop a metatheory of dignity to overcome this problem. He specifies the minimum function of dignity as setting off what has dignity in practical deliberations, and formulates three criteria that a substantive account of dignity should satisfy in order to fulfil this minimum function. By analysing the use of dignity in these two political movements I try to uncover the substantial account of dignity that they use, and I confront this with Debes’ formal criteria for dignity to establish whether they are using a valid or invalid conception of dignity. The purpose of the paper is two-fold: is not only to judge whether these political movements are basing their normative critique on a strong and defensible conception of dignity, but also to see if Debes’ formal criteria for dignity hold up when confronted with practical uses of the term. If it is possible to formulate widely accepted formal criteria for the concept of dignity, than the concept can perform an important function in practical deliberations and forms a powerful mode of normative critique.

Lynne Rudder Baker considers constitution to be ubiquitous. Artifacts, natural kinds, persons etc. are constituted by—not identical to—their matter. On Baker’s view an individual with a primary-kind property, such as ‘being a lump of clay’, comes to constitute an object with another primary-kind property, such as ‘being a statue’, when the clay is in appropriate circumstances. Having a primary-kind property is a marker of ontological significance. I argue that Baker’s definition does not satisfactorily account for composite objects within her practical realist framework. Aggregates of matter that constitute composite objects are not good candidates for a practical realist’s notion of ontological significance. Thus, it is not appropriate to assign those aggregates a primary-kind property. I evaluate Baker’s attempts to reconcile the constitution view with unrestricted mereological composition and suggest two potential solutions.
Plato’s and Kierkegaard’s Reading of Imitation

Plato’s and Kierkegaard’s engagement with mimesis occurs predominantly in their discussion of imitation. Extensively debated in Platonic studies and, fairly new to the Kierkegaardian conversation, imitation is an important facet of the thinkers’ philosophies. In Plato’s works imitation—mainly discussed in his Republic—constitutes the true philosopher and the role of art in the ideal society. Kierkegaard’s employment of imitation—predominantly understood as the phenomenon of following after—occurs mainly in his so-called late works namely: Practice in Christianity and Judge for Yourself! For Kierkegaard, imitation is what is necessary to become the ideal self, namely the single individual in his becoming a true Christian.

In this paper I argue that both thinkers through their critical account of imitation present two types of imitation in which one can distinguish positive and negative engagements with that phenomenon. The negative employment of imitation refers to the external facets of the emulated objects that are contingent with regard to their essence, and are without consideration to what constitute them. The positive type of imitation relates to the ideals, therefore the true imitator in that sense emulates the unaltered and changeless objects with “regard to their nature and meaning.” The genuine imitator in Plato’s and Kierkegaard’s thoughts uses “the divine paradigm” or is subjected to the absolute respectively.

This juxtaposition emphasizes the deep influence of Plato’s philosophy on Kierkegaard’s thought in the sphere of mimesis. It also shows, what seems to be so far undiscussed by the scholars, that Plato’s concept of imitation has its existential dimension. According to both thinkers, the one who mimetically engages with the ideals, before introducing the ideals into society, must first appropriate them into his own existence. In consequence, this existential employment of the ideals legitimizes the genuine imitator.

Robyn Kath
University of Sydney, Australia

Procreation is Risky (and therefore Wrong)

I argue that acts of a certain risky kind are, other things being equal, wrong. If this is correct we must reject one of the following three common claims about procreation: 1) other things being equal, creating a wretched person is wrong; 2) other things being equal, creating a happy person is at best permissible; 3) other things being equal, ordinary acts of procreation are permissible. I suggest that we should reject claim 3.
Evie Kendal
Monash University, Australia

*Equal Opportunity and the Case for State Sponsored Ectogenesis in Australia: A Feminist Perspective*

The purpose of this paper is to examine the case for state sponsored ectogenesis in Australia from a feminist perspective, paying particular attention to issues of equal opportunity and accessibility for women. Ectogenesis is commonly defined as the “extrauterine gestation of human fetuses from conception to ‘birth’,” although it could also entail artificial incubation of an embryo or fetus transferred from a woman’s uterus after conception (Warren, 1986). According to Leslie Cannold, the use of assisted reproductive technologies, such as *in vitro* fertilisation (IVF), combined with the ever-decreasing age of viability for premature infants, indicates that ectogenesis is already a “limited reality” in Australia (Cannold, 1995). As it is predicted Australia will experience significant economic strain resulting from its aging population, and with infertility rates on the rise, research into new reproductive technologies is expected to continue. However, despite certain advantages for women’s reproductive liberty, feminist groups remain divided regarding the desirability of current and future assisted reproductive technologies, including ectogenesis. In this paper I will be exploring one feminist perspective, arguing that the current necessity for biological gestation and childbirth impose unjust burdens on women physically, socially and financially. This injustice stems from an unequal distribution of the risks and benefits associated with human reproduction, weighted to women’s disadvantage. As a result, it is my contention that the ideals of equal opportunity demand sustained research into ectogenesis, such that in the future women might have the option of being liberated from these burdens when seeking to start a family. Furthermore, I argue that access to such services should not be limited to the wealthy, but rather that a robust public system should be established that guarantees fair and equal access to this reproductive technology, regardless of ability to pay.

David Kinkead
University of Queensland, Australia

*An Attempt to Solve the Boundary Problem*

Just who ought comprise ‘the people’ within a polity, and how this should be determined, has been a problem that political theorists have wrestled with for over 40 years. The inadequacies of extant solutions such as the All-Affected Principle and All-Subjected Principle, cast lingering doubts as to whether any account of democratic legitimacy can ever effectively stand upon an inadequate account of political membership.

In this paper I propose a novel solution to the Boundary Problem, comprising a normative component, the Principle of Reciprocal Autonomy, and an instrumental component, Dynamic Federalism.
Together, I argue that these two concepts allow us to overcome the problem of how to legitimate membership within a polity, whilst offering a mechanism of political association that is both plausible and realisable.

**Julian Koplin**

**Monash University, Australia**

**The Burden of Proof in Bioethical Debates**

While claims that those arguing against a particular position must bear the burden of proof are ubiquitous within bioethics, there has been surprisingly little written on how we can fairly determine who should bear this burden. This is especially problematic as participants on both sides of many debates attempt to place the burden of proof on their opponents. In *The Ethics of Transplants*, Janet Radcliffe Richards provides a seemingly straightforward methodology for working through practical problems, with a particular focus on the controversy surrounding kidney sales from living donors. It involves a form of tightly structured presumptive reasoning, where a starting presumption in favour of a particular policy can only be defeated if counter-arguments meet a clearly specified burden of proof. This method of enquiry is deeply appealing, not least because of its promise to keep arguments ordered and set clear conditions for argumentative success. However, I will argue that these attractive features come at the significant cost of unfairly dismissing valid arguments and favouring one side on any given issue. In effect, Radcliffe Richards’ methodology settles the organ sale debate before it even begins through establishing a burden of proof that opponents of paid kidney procurement are unable to meet. Based on my discussion of this methodology, I will argue that in practical ethics even non-rebuttable arguments do not create a presumption either for or against a proposal. The concept of the burden of proof, in the sense used by Radcliffe Richards, is inapplicable to questions of practical ethics.

**Ariel Kruger**

**University of Melbourne, Australia**

**Toward Necessary Conditions for Scientific Explanation**

Two conditions are necessary in order for an ideal explanation to demonstrate good scientific understanding. The conditions are subsumption under a generalisation as well as reference to the cause of the event to be explained. Both conditions are justified using widely held intuitions. However, philosophical prudence dictates that certain claims about the nature of causation be justified in order for the conditions to be coherent. After justifying why the two conditions are necessary to ideal scientific explanation, I will focus on the causal
component and outline a view of causation derived from Wesley Salmon that supports the two conditions.

Dominic Lenzi
University of Melbourne, Australia

The Virtue of Care for Nature

On first glance, caring for nature looks like an important environmental virtue. Conservationists, wildlife managers, ecologists, and many others appear to behave in ways which, in interpersonal contexts, we would not hesitate to call caring.

But what does it actually mean to care for nature? For some environmental philosophers, we can understand such as this via reductive analyses of ‘nature’, in which certain features are emphasised as ‘morally considerable’. However, I will argue that this is a serious mistake. The concept of ‘nature’ is instead a social construction which can mean very different things in different contexts. What this means is that we cannot hope to make an objective list of morally salient features of nature, which we ought to be responsive to in some way.

Building on this claim, I will defend an account of care for nature which emphasises care as a developed receptivity to nature as we find it. On my view, receptivity is a feature of all forms of care, and shows how care for nature develops from the virtue of interpersonal care, or care for persons. Emphasising the socially constructed meanings of ‘nature’, I will argue that we can come closer to an understanding of the virtue of care for nature not by isolating certain morally salient features, but by identifying some of the ordinary reasons that we find to be characteristic of people who are environmentally virtuous.

Jose R. Lezama
University of Adelaide, Australia

Is Moral Education still Possible?

The interest in promoting moral education has historically waxed and waned depending on regional political agendas. Today this interest has come again to the fore, at least in some countries. The methods of moral education have in turn changed along the years, oscillating between transferring social values and norms, and cultivating some specific character traits. Which method is more efficient naturally depends upon the goals of moral education as such. However, it is questionable whether these methods taken separately are enough to ensure the durability and reliability of moral judgments and behaviour over time. Fortunately, there are theoretical results within the discipline of psychology that can be exploited in order to propose more efficient and more reasonable models of moral pedagogy. This
will be my focus. In this paper I intend to do two things: 1) To provide a brief overview of the current psychological discussion on moral competences, especially in regard to moral judgement (its nature and effectiveness), moral character (its role, development and efficacy) and the relationship between both and moral behaviour. This will allow us to better know the terrain upon which any moral education approach has to be developed. And 2), to suggest what factors should be considered when designing a proposal for moral education focused on virtues and character building that does not end up as a simple declaration of good intentions.

Szu-Yen Lin

University of Auckland, New Zealand

Work-Meaning and Context

The relevance of contextuality in literary interpretation has remained a heated debate. To address this issue, two dominant models of interpretation have been proposed: the modern context theory and the original context theory. The former claims that the present context in which the interpreter is located can be considered in interpretation, based on the assumption that work-meaning changes with historical context. By contrast, the original context theory states that it is the past context that should be considered. On this view, the meaning of a work was fixed by factors present at its creation, and interpretation should be guided by these relevant constraints. The aim of this paper is to argue from an ontological point of view that the modern context theory, relying on questionable ontology that raises several fatal worries, is less attractive than its counterpart for literary interpretation.

Bruce Long

University of Sydney, Australia

Platonic Structures Cannot be Informational

Mark Colyvan and Aidan Lyon argue that the considerable explanatory resources of phase spaces derive from the fact that they are – in many ways uniquely and significantly – informational (embody, realize, and provide information.) Moreover, the considerable information that they provide is not explicable on a non-Platonic basis, and that the best explanation is that phase spaces are information bearing or informational Platonic abstracta. This is taken to provide support for Platonism about mathematical abstracta and entities, and to be evidence that the indispensability of mathematics is dependent upon the existence of Platonic mathematical abstracta. I will argue that regarding phase spaces as Platonic abstracta begs the question in favour of Platonism, and that their informational explanatory resources cannot be derived from any non-casual and non-spatiotemporal structures (if such exist) in principle. The kind of
mathematical Platonism relied upon by Colyvan and Lyon is that which regards mathematical abstracta, structures, and numbers as a-priori mind, representation, and language independent existents in the ontology: they exist prior to any physical instantiation or tokening by/with internal or external syntactic and diagrammatic representation (any physical structure(s)). I will argue that if phase spaces exist in this way (which Colyvan requires), then they could not possibly be explanatory by way of providing information because such entities, if they existed, could not possibly be informational or be information-based truthmakers. I will use an information-theoretic and metaphysical argument that is in some ways similar to the epistemic argument against knowledge of Platonic entities in support of the eliatic principle, but without the vulnerabilities of the epistemic argument.

Kate Lowry

Monash University, Australia

Epicurus on Politics

Epicurus discouraged political involvement because he believed that involvement in politics caused anxiety and pain. 'The life of politics' in the ancient world was very much about timē or status and he believed that those who sought freedom from fear through social status were mistaken. Nonetheless, there were exceptions, in particular when one's tranquility was jeopardised. The interpretations provided by Gert Roskam (2007), Eric Brown (2009) and Jeffrey Fish (2011) demonstrate the flexibility in Epicurean doctrine towards politics. All three argue that the prohibition on political involvement is not as clear-cut as previous Epicurean scholars would hold. If the circumstances were right, an Epicurean did not have to abstain from politics, instead involvement could be encouraged. These three authors source their ideas from different aspects of the Epicurean tradition nonetheless they all argue that their interpretations are consistent with the ideas of Epicurus himself. This paper further adds to this understanding of Epicurean political involvement by highlighting that it was not the pursuit of power that Epicurus found abhorrent and advised against, but the attitude that the pursuer attached to the exercise which resulted in pain and anxiety. If an Epicurean proceeds in the right way, then political involvement is more than an acceptable means to the end goal of tranquility. My contention is that what motivates an Epicurean into political involvement is the maintenance of their tranquility and I insist that every action must be referred to the tranquil life. If an object of desire falls into the category of a false desire and jeopardises tranquility then it must be abandoned, and there are many roles in political life where this is the case. However, I can agree that if approached in the right way a political life does not necessarily have to become a false desire.
Some philosophers have argued that we ought to reject the use of intuitions as evidence in philosophy. Defenders of intuition have responded that such arguments are self-defeating, since they inevitably require epistemic principles for which no non-intuitive justification can be found. However, Paul Silva (2012) has argued that this response is too weak: even if arguments for the widespread rejection of intuitions are self-defeating, this alone does not positively justify the practice. Silva offers one self-defeating argument that he takes to still pose a live threat. I will show that his argument in fact entails that we are positively justified in thinking that intuitions are a worthy source of evidence; and that it can be refuted using a principle that entails the same.

This paper addresses the issue of humans as creatures capable of knowledge from a cognitive perspective. In particular, thanks to the belief revision framework, it is possible to provide a better understanding of the cognitive psychology experiments aimed at disproving the capability of apes to display high-level linguistic skills. Further research shows how these experiments have been biased by a misunderstanding of the cognitive relevance of animal intentionality: since intentional relevance is acknowledged as the key for the understanding of actions as meaningful (on behalf of the individual), it is highlighted how the attribution of meaning cannot but rely on contextually-driven clues. If there is a difference between humans and apes, then, it does not rely on the mere possession of different contexts—otherwise there would be neither ground for comparison, nor possibility of mutual behaviour predictions. Hence, difference relies on the qualitative distinction between biologically-fixed contexts and socially-variable contexts: both of them allow for meaningful and purposeful prediction of others' actions, although the former (apes') strategy relies on systematic inference performed on fixed sets of clues, whereas in the latter (humans') strategy relies on the systematic change of systems of inference, thus varying the set of clues one or more individuals can deal with. Ultimately, this supports
the idea of humans as beings that are (at least) capable of systematic and strategic belief revision, which leads to scientific knowledge.

**Duncan Martin**

*Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand*

**Moral Exemplars and Ecological Attitudes**

Theories of environmental ethics require both an account of the norms of action and the norms of character that ought to govern our human interactions with nature. Virtue-oriented approaches are said to provide us with the latter, but can they provide us with the former? I propose that this question can be answered in the affirmative. On the latter, I draw upon a number of extentionist and exemplarist approaches, and discuss the ways in which virtue ethics can provide insights into the causes and solutions surrounding the global environmental crisis, particularly in terms of character and attitudes. On the former, I aim to defend the claim “an action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances” in light of prominent objections, and thereby set out to provide a distinctively virtue ethical account of right action. I argue that a theory of this kind requires answers around what the relevant virtuous agents would be like, and draw upon exemplarist virtue theory to construct an account of how one may characterize said agents.

**Fatalistic Stories: Narrative Motivation and Addiction**

Addiction can be caused and entrenched by fatalistic life expectations. But what form does this fatalism take and what theoretical structure is best to understand and counter it? It seems that, in a certain subset of cases, the agent’s self-narrative is the source of fatalistic motivation. This is particularly clear in cases of addiction where the agent’s fatalism is not simply passive (no action) or wanton (pursuit of obvious incentives) but where he goes out of his way to enact a story of suffering and death. Such fatalism can also be seen in cases where recovery is initiated by making changes to one’s fatalistic self-narrative. I argue that the motivational effects of self-narratives partially escape reward accounts (Ainslie) and relatively idealistic normative accounts (Bratman). Therefore, the responses these accounts can recommend, changes in incentives or normative restructuring, are suboptimal in these cases. Narrative self-constitution easily accommodates the motivational effects of fatalistic narratives and can recommend a better, if not easier, solution: narrative self-transformation.

**Doug McConnell**

*Macquarie University, Australia*
Is Mathematics Unreasonably Effective in the Natural Sciences?

Since its publication in 1960, Wigner's paper "The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences" has attracted comment from scientists, applied mathematicians and philosophers keen to give their take on what Wigner calls "the miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics". There is much disagreement concerning both the nature of the miracle and, more fundamentally, whether there is a miracle, or, indeed, anything mysterious, at all. Part of the confusion is caused by individuals’ different backgrounds and their different experiences of the applicability of mathematics. My main purpose in this talk is to separate the general proposition:

P1: That there is something mysterious, or unreasonable, about the fact that mathematics is an effective tool for physical applications;

from another, related, but more specific proposition; i.e.

P2: That mathematics is unreasonably effective in certain applications; specifically, in applications at the cutting-edge of fundamental physics.

Because of Wigner’s exposition it is not entirely clear what proposition he is arguing for and he tends to conflate these two issues. I shall argue that the second issue is genuinely mysterious, whatever one's philosophy of mathematics. Furthermore, I shall argue that this mystery can only be explained by some fundamental relationship between mathematics and reality.

A Reply to Situationist Attacks on Virtue Epistemology

Recently, situationists have extended their criticism of virtue ethics to both reliabilist and responsibilist varieties of virtue epistemology. Lauren Olin and John Doris argue that the account of intellectual virtue offered by reliabilism is not empirically supported, as studies in social psychology show that cognitive function is highly dependent on (or influenced by) context. Mark Alfano argues that responsibilism is untenable, as it depends on the existence of stable character-traits which are also empirically unsupported by studies in social psychology. My paper is a critical response to these arguments.
Ethical Wolves, or, What the Pragmatic Virtue Ethicist can learn from Situationism

Consider the following scenario: it is 1997, and Tony Blair’s labour government has just taken office in the United Kingdom. Heathrow airport has been struggling to work past its capacity for some years, and Tony’s government is under pressure from airlines, airport operators, business groups and the tourism industry because of its ‘failure’ to remedy this problem. The government tried to balance opposing views and defuse the tensions between them via a process of ‘therapeutic consultation’. Precisely the opposite occurred. The consultation process encouraged pro- and anti-expansion groups to form lobbying coalitions, which intensified the tensions between them in their efforts to sway the government. The government’s attempt to authoritatively but inclusively settle the matter left it in the awkward rhetorical position of trying to both promote the aviation industry and protect the environment.

How well can ethicists respond to a complex problem like this? It doesn’t appear that a utilitarian accounting of preferences or a deontological assessment of stakeholder rights will lead to an answer. Virtue ethics speaks in terms of goods, motivations and individual people, and so it might assist: but the situationist critique, which holds that character traits may not exist at all, poses a problem. I will look at the psychological research underlying situationism and argue that, all things considered, neither side of the situationist debate is alone correct and that a hybrid view could help ethicists respond to wicked problems.

The Relationship between Morality and Politics in the Work of Raimond Gaita

Raimond Gaita’s work offers a compelling account of the sources of morality and value, while at times suggesting that morality and politics may be incommensurable. Indeed, many of the moral theories which hold morality to be unproblematically commensurable with politics (conceptually if not in practice, for example utilitarianism) look very different to Gaita’s. In this paper I ask whether we can accept something like Gaita’s view of our moral world and at the same time resist the suggestion that morality and politics may be incommensurable, or whether this is likely to involve, in Gaita’s words, a failure ‘to see fully the tragic mismatch that can exist between the world and what can justify us and our deeds.’ I begin by offering a number of reasons for resisting claims of incommensurability between morality and politics. I then sketch two ways in which we might conceive of the two as commensurable that
do not involve a rejection of Gaita’s moral philosophy but rather take it as their starting points. Given certain difficulties with both of these ways, I conclude by briefly mentioning a third way which involves a theological turn, and I suggest that at least one of Gaita’s reasons for avoiding theological accounts of moral phenomena is misplaced.

Brook Michael Novak
La Trobe University, Australia

Dissolution of the Hand: Pragmatism and Digital Fabrication Technologies.

This paper explores the philosophical tensions between craft, agency and the technological that is emerging in the development of digital fabrication technologies. Recent technological and economic advances in the field of 3D printing in particular present challenges in a number of domains. Drawing principally on the philosophical pragmatism of Richard Sennett in The Craftsman, I will suggest that this aspect of the technological entails a loss of agency that occurs through agency itself, with ramifications for ideals of autonomy and emancipation. Sennett’s project attempts to reconfigure the position of worker and citizen within a pragmatic framework extolling the virtues of craft, which is characterized as a blend of techne and arête. While such a project is laudable, it is threatened especially by digital fabrication technologies, which raises questions for Sennett’s positing of craft as a fundamental human ontology and more questions about the perceived benefits of the technological itself.

Ross Pain
La Trobe University, Australia

Naïve Realism, Representationalism, and the Two Component View

It has been notoriously difficult to combine the core insights that motivate naïve realism and those that underpin representationalism into a coherent theory of perception. Naïve realists, for example, argue that representational states cannot adequately account for the phenomenological directness of perceptual experience, while representationalists maintain that indirect theories best explain perceptual anomalies such as illusions and hallucinations. These disagreements highlight the fact that the core commitments of direct and indirect theories of perception are fundamentally at odds. One cannot accommodate the two without critically undermining the foundational claims of at least one. In this paper I argue for a view that is neither direct nor strictly representational in any standard sense. Critical realism is a version of the causal theory of perception that asserts that perceptual experience is made up of two distinct components. 1) A conceptual component, or "perceptual taking", that refers directly to the external world. This involves the (possibly mistaken) application of low-level classificatory concepts, and
accounts for the intentional directedness of perception. 2) A non-conceptual sensory inner state which accounts for the phenomenal character of experience. I hold that critical realism is the best chance we have of accounting for the competing claims of naïve realists and representationalists.

Salman Panahy
University of Melbourne

The Justification of Deduction. A Proof-Theoretic Approach

The subject of justification of deduction have been considered in different ways; some logicians and philosophers such as Susan Haack and Paul Boghassion have thought of that as dealing with epistemic questions such as: Is it possible for someone S to be justified in believing that all arguments of the form modus ponens are necessarily truth-preserving? Their approach to the topic is such that this issue can be followed by attempting to find a justification for believing to a set of propositions or truth of them.

Some other thinkers have traced the other rout; they have tried to answer a more pragmatic question: what can be done with logical systems as tools? Michael Dummett, for instance, went a lot back, to the conditions of the possibility of deduction, to give an explanation of how deductive inferences work. In this approach, also, there is room for answering questions about conditions need to be met to come across knowledge by a deductive vehicle. Dag Prawitz has attempted to hand a formalization of such conditions.

First I shall try to give an account of main points of each approach briefly and then I shall reformulate the question of the justification of deduction, considering main points of both viewpoints.

Tiffany Plotzza
La Trobe University, Australia

Subjectivity and the Other: The Founding Role of the Other in the Formation of Subjectivity in the Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas.

Within the ethical framework of Emmanuel Levinas the extent to which the ethical relation provides a foundation for ethics is a crucial question that pervades the majority of Levinasian scholarship. Most commentators engage with this question in some way, shape, or form, yet fail to provide a clear and convincing answer that avoids paradoxical conclusions and self-contradictions. In particular many fail to adequately address the way in which Levinas’s conception of the encounter with the Other constitutes the subjectivity of the ‘I’. In this paper I want to critically analyse the way in which the Other has a founding role in the formation of subjectivity, and examine the contention that it is in this way that the ethical relation acts as some type of foundation for the subject’s ethical obligation to the other person. Focusing primarily on Levinas’s ethical framework as it is presented in Totality and Infinity, I want to engage with the idea that
the ethical relation may provide a foundation for ethics, not as a foundational principle in an ethical system, but as a revelatory occurrence that founds the very nature of subjectivity.

Robert Ralston
University of Adelaide, Australia

An Investigation into the Social Intuitionist Claims about the Formation of Moral Judgment: What Do the Rare Cases Suggest?

Jonathan Haidt’s influential social intuitionist model (SIM) of moral judgment suggests a hierarchical relationship between pre-reflective and reflective cognition in the formation of moral judgment. It includes a default moral judgment process where people make moral judgments on the basis of pre-reflective and typically affect-laden moral intuitions, and then engage in reflective moral reasoning as part of an attempt to retrospectively rationalize their intuitive judgment. It also includes a surrogate moral judgment process where people make moral judgments on the basis of reflective moral reasoning, but only in rare out of the ordinary cases where moral intuitions first fail to produce and maintain a moral judgment. In this presentation, I suggest that the failure of pre-reflective cognition in the formation of moral judgment is not just a rare anomaly but something that indicates the persistence of unresolved conflict, and that the resolution of persistent conflict is a crucial part of the human capacity for moral judgment that requires reflective cognition. I then outline an alternative to the SIM which suggests a more continuous relationship between a potentially more common pre-reflective moral judgment process that provides us with an efficient means of resolving a number of everyday moral problems, and a potentially less common reflective moral judgment process that provides us with an effective means of resolving many of the moral problems that lie outside the scope of pre-reflective cognition.

Stephanie Rennick
Macquarie University, Australia / Glasgow University, UK

Why Foreknowledge Does Not Always Entail Problematic Predestination

This paper considers the folk intuition that a foreknown future would be counter-intuitively and unattractively fixed, and seeks to show that we make a mistake when we reject foreknowledge wholesale on the grounds that it entails problematic predestination ('metaphysical fatalism'). To this end I consider two crucial yet overlooked distinctions: (i) the different senses in which we might mean 'fixing the future', and (ii) the various kinds of foreknowledge the folk intuition might have in mind. I argue that neither ordinary foreknowledge nor the knowledge of the time traveller gives rise to problematic predestination, and that the latter arises only when extra
characteristics (such as infallibility) are implicitly built in to our conception of a foreknower.

David Rowe
La Trobe University, Melbourne

Skepticism about Moral Judgment Internalism

In *A Clockwork Orange*, Alex is undertaking treatment to overcome his urges for ‘ultra-violence’. Nurse Feeley says to Alex, in regards to the treatment, “you felt ill this afternoon because you’re getting better... when we’re healthy, we respond to the presence of hatred with fear and nausea. You are becoming healthy, that’s all. By this time tomorrow you will be healthier still.”

Why is Nurse Feeley saying this? Ask the metaethicist who is an internalist about moral judgement and they will respond that it is because our motivations to act track our moral judgements, at least in the practically rational agent. Alex certainly appears rational, and he may even be able to make judgements about what is right and wrong; he just *chooses* evil—compare Milton’s Satan who says “Farewell remorse; all good to me is lost/Evil, be thou my good.” As it stands, this appears to be a counterexample to the internalist about moral judgements. The onus is on the internalist, therefore, to explain away this apparent counter-example. The literature is littered with such examples and counter-examples. Intuitions sway one to one side or the other.

In this paper I broach this issue from a different angle. I ask ‘what is needed for the internalist to show that this relation between moral judgement and motivation actually exists?’ I claim that the internalist must show what this relation is. The problem is that arguments for the internalist claim do no more than assert that a constant conjunction exists between two event-types. But this is susceptible to a skeptical challenge. The challenge says that it is possible that this constant conjunction between two event types could be satisfied wholly by accident, thus showing that the relation between moral judgement and motivation to act is contingent, at best.

Ryoji Sato
Monash University, Australia

The “Apparent” Richness of Visual Experience and Theories of Consciousness

One of the essential tasks for theories of consciousness is to explain characteristics consciousness seems to have. The apparent richness of visual experience is one such example; our experience seems to contain fine-grained colors and shapes that exceed our conceptual abilities to describe them. So called dissociative theories of consciousness take it at face value and argue the neural basis of
consciousness is distinct from that of reportability. However, the problem is that the richness of visual experience is probably "mere" appearance in peripheral vision; a variety of empirical findings suggest our peripheral vision is not sensitive to fine-grained colors and shapes. This presents us a puzzle. The empirical findings suggest our visual experience is actually impoverished in the periphery and we are somehow entertaining "illusion" of richness. However, this picture is hard to accept because experience seems to be a realm where appearance and reality coincides. In this paper, I examine solutions to the puzzle and constraints it imposes to theories of consciousness. Especially, I consider a solution given by higher-order theorists of consciousness (Lau and Rosenthal 2011) and my own solution using reverse hierarchical theory of vision (Hochstein and Ahissar 2002) and predictive codings.

Mark Saward
Monash University, Australia

How Not To Make A Fine-Tuning Argument

In this paper I present what I call the naive Fine-Tuning Argument (naive FTA). The naive FTA takes the most intuitive approach of using the evidence of fine-tuning, in an attempt to demonstrate God's existence. In this way, the naive FTA reflects some common features of extant FTA's. However, the naive FTA suffers from serious weaknesses that render it implausible as a demonstration of God's existence. In this talk, I will outline the core weaknesses, then compare the naive FTA to one extant argument, showing where it shares important similarities with the naive FTA. Finally, I will discuss the implications this has for the possibility of a successful FTA

Sebastian Schneider
University of Lucerne, Switzerland

Rethinking the Concept of War – a Philosophical Approach

Today's discourse in thinking about war reminds us of the famous Clausewitzian dictum that "war is a chameleon" that is constantly changing its nature: in former ages war was often characterised by the clash of similar armies and decisive battles, whereas today we talk about asymmetry, terrorism and atrocities to civilians. Open and unsolved questions stemming from this new situation are highlighted in current world politics. Today, the concept of war can be used and exploited for political purposes in one way or another, as can be seen, for example, with the so called "War on terror".

In my paper, I want to outline some ideas about a new conceptualisation of war from a philosophical perspective, which may be helpful for further debates and conceptual clarification. In doing so, I will proceed in three steps. First, I will look at what the point is of having a concept of war and from this determine the requirements for
such a concept. Second, I will have a brief look at some of the most common definitions of war (including Hobbes and Clausewitz, and also newer ones such as that from the Correlates of War Project) to delineate the span of approaches and the criteria that are used to characterise the concept of war. In the third and final step of my paper, I will take a closer look at three of these criteria: Should we see war as a state, act or event? Is war something that can only be carried out by States? How can we measure the intensity of a conflict? I shall discuss whether the proposed approaches and criteria can be maintained or have to be customised or left aside to satisfy the requirements developed earlier.

Chung-Chen Soong,
University of Auckland, New Zealand

Understanding Kendall Walton in the Dream

This paper interprets Kendall Walton’s claim that it is only fictional that we have psychological attitudes toward fictional characters. I approach Walton’s claim from his theory of dreaming. First, I illustrate the realistic manner of the dream, the first-person consciousness in the dream, and the psychological attitudes we have in the dream. And then I explain the distinction between our psychological attitudes in the dream and our psychological attitudes toward the dream itself. Once the nature of dreaming is understood, we could proceed in a similar way to Walton’s theory of imagining, and finally understand his claim that it is only fictional that we have psychological attitudes toward fictional characters.

Cristian Soto
University of Melbourne, Australia / University of Chile, Chile

A Structural Realist Approach to Laws of Nature

In this paper I examine the metaphysics of science of ontic structural realism. My threefold argument addresses the following issues, viz.: first, naturalistic metaphysics; second, the ontology of ontic structural realism; and third, the metaphysical boundaries of ontic structural realism. As to the first, I briefly describe the aim and scope of naturalistic metaphysics, examining the role and limits of a scientifically motivated metaphysical research. I particularly pay attention to the ontological and methodological primacy of physics, as proposed by upholders of this view. Regarding the second part of my argument, I will schematically expound the core ontological framework of ontic structural realism, namely: the modal structure of the world, the notions of pattern and locator, and the proposed characterization of projection, causation, and laws of nature. Lastly, the third part of my argument examines the metaphysical boundaries of ontic structural realism, putting forward a critique of this position. In this respect, I carefully look into the detail of three issues that I
think need to be further developed if what is looked for is to account for a realist interpretation of science. These considerations are intended to illustrate deep-going problems of the current debate, namely: the aim and scope of scientific metaphysics, the challenges of a realist understanding of quantum physics, and the Peircean stochastic view of laws of nature.

 Severin Staalesen
 University of Melbourne, Australia

Multiple Relisation and the Metaphysics of Disunity: a Response to Kim

Emergence is not a popular position in philosophy of mind. In both its original form, qua British Emergentism, and under its current guise of non-reductive physicalism, it is almost universally held to be inconsistent with physicalism. This is due in no small part to Jaegwon Kim’s well known supervenience argument, which some credit with precipitating a new wave of reductionism in philosophy of mind. However, while simple and compelling at first sight, upon closer consideration it is far from clear that Kim’s argument is conclusive. In particular it would seem that Kim’s argument rests upon a metaphysical position that is far from incontrovertible. Kim assumes that the causal powers of supervenient properties must be inherited from their subvenient base. In so doing he belies a prior commitment to reductive physicalism which is not in fact justified. While it may be clear that physicalism in some broad sense follows incontrovertibly from our current epistemic situation, it is not clear that reductive physicalism does. So what Kim takes to be a ‘perfectly intuitive’ starting point is in fact an article of faith. If so, it would seem that Kim’s argument, and new wave reductionism more generally, is not so devastating for emergentism after all.

 Marilyn Stendera
 University of Melbourne, Australia

The Unready-to-Hand: A Heideggerian Response to Michael Wheeler

Aspects of Heidegger's account of our practical, purposive engagement with the world have long been drawn upon in various ways by discourses within cognitive science and the philosophies of mind and consciousness. Michael Wheeler is a prominent contemporary proponent of an approach that seeks to utilise Heideggerian insights within the framework of so-called 'embedded-embodied' cognitive science. This paper will explore and question the reading of Heidegger upon which Wheeler bases his arguments, focusing on his intriguing emphasis on the notion of the unready-to-hand. I will argue that, while Wheeler’s approach is profoundly promising - especially in raising many opportunities for fruitful dialogue between phenomenology and
the 'new' cognitive science - his interpretation of Heidegger's views can and should be challenged in several fundamental ways. I show that there are significant tensions between Wheeler's schematisation of the types of our encounters with other entities and Heidegger's own model of such relations, and that these tensions have vital implications for the ways in which Wheeler and others integrate Heideggerian ideas into their accounts of cognition. I will close by reflecting upon some of the considerations that this raises for the prospect of a 'Heideggerian cognitive science' in general.

Saranga Sudarshian
University of Sydney, Australia

Luck-Egalitarianism and Harshness

Luck-Egalitarianism has been attacked viciously since it was first put forward. One devastating problem posed is the Harshness Problem that contends that luck-egalitarian principles treat individuals too harshly for them to reasonably accept these principles as a normative standard for distributive justice. All current defences of luck-egalitarianism fall into two categories: 1) Add a principle or modify existing principles to limit the scope of egalitarian judgement or to assure a minimum welfare standard. 2) To bite the bullet and affirm the flexibility of luck-egalitarianism in token cases of harsh treatment. In this paper I want to first reinterpet the Harshness Problem correctly and argue that all current defences of luck-egalitarianism are unsatisfactory. I argue that rather than defending luck-egalitarianism by incomplete ad-hoc changes or token foot stamping we must embrace luck-egalitarianism more strongly as a theory of distributive justice that justifies the arrangement of all social institutions rather than just a select few.

Xavier Symons
Australian Catholic University, Australia

Rethinking Cognition - a Thomistic Account of intentionality

"Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs". The existence and nature of intentionality in the human mind is currently a much debated topic. A great number of philosophers - in a variety of traditions - are trying to refine theories about how our thoughts come to be about the world (how our thoughts have content that relates to and represents extra-mental reality).

In my paper, I will offer an account of the theory of intentionality proposed by the medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas was one of the first philosophers to discuss the topic of intentionality, and his approach to the topic was significantly different to that of most modern philosophers. I believe that it is profitable to study Aquinas' writings as he gives us a new way of explaining
intentionality. Modern philosophers have offered many theories to explain this phenomenon, but none clearly escape major objections. In the first section of this essay I will discuss the different interpretations of Aquinas' theory of intentionality, and argue for what I think to be the most convincing one. As I interpret him, Aquinas explains intentionality by positing a formal sameness between the contents of the mind and the objects observed in the world. In the second section I will discuss how contemporary philosophy of mind could profit by adopting the Thomistic explanation of intentionality. Aquinas' account - a 'direct realist' view of cognition - avoids the major objections plaguing representationalist explanations of intentionality (the dominant theory in philosophy of cognition today).

Adam Tuszyński

University of Warsaw, Poland

Introduction to the Group-Mind Theory of Group Agency

According to the theory of group agency, established by Phillip Pettit and Christian List, in some conditions, certain groups of individual agents are the rational agents themselves. The crucial claim is that these groups have a (group) mind of their own and (group) intentional states, which cannot be reduced to the states and minds of individual group members, despite remaining in a supervenience relation with the individual group members. Therefore, the theory is also known as the group-mind theory.

Firstly, in this speech, I am going to reconstruct the group-mind theory. In doing so, I will be attempting to point out that this theory makes a natural complement to the previous accounts heard in the debate about the problem of group intentionality, particularly in the non-summative accounts.

Secondly, I will be defending the theory from the selected arguments, which have been presented recently in the subject literature.

Thirdly, I will be considering a hypothesis according to which it is justifiable to apply some of neuroscientific studies like the theory of mirror neurons, as complementary to the group agency theory, in general and the group-mind theory, in particular. If so, this joint research can reveal that human beings are, in fact, evolutionary designed to cooperate with each other and create complex cognitive group structures.
In a series of articles Sellars examines some of the aspects of Kantian Transcendental Philosophy in relation to his own Critical Realist Theory. The most compelling of these works, at least for this paper, is the last, rather short article The Role of the Imagination in Kant's Theory of Experience. Interestingly, the very title of this paper does not reflect its content: here Sellars patiently unfolds the relationship between perceptual consciousness and perceptual demonstratives, which serves to elucidate his theory of perception. Crucially, he appropriates the power of imagination, from Kant’s first Critique, to integrate all components into a rigorous perceptual experience. On this view, as I will demonstrate, the imagination is stripped of its transcendental function, pivotal for the entire Kantian architectonic.

In this paper, I want to advert one to the orthodox functions of productive imagination in Kant’s critical works. First, I will invoke transcendental apperception to irradiate the function of transcendental synthesis of imagination, abjured by Sellars. Second, I will turn to the third Critique, ignored by Sellars, where Kant augments his treatment of productive imagination and introduces aesthetic ideas, ‘the full inner intuitions’ that transform empirical experience into an aesthetic one. The latter poses a threat to Sellars ‘austere’ account of productive imagination.
Laurence Waugh
The University of Melbourne, Australia

An Answer to the Trolley Problem

I would like to venture an answer to the Trolley Problem. The Trolley Problem is the problem of explaining why it would be permissible for a bystander to turn a runaway trolley from five workmen towards one workman, but impermissible for a bystander to push a fat man in front of a runaway trolley headed towards five workmen.

The Trolley Problem has been around for well over a quarter of a century by now. Unfortunately, all of the proposed answers to it have shown themselves to be defective in one way or another. In the non-consequentialist literature on the topic, philosophers have tended to adopt one of three approaches:

1. Some have attended to the agent’s intentions
2. Some have attended to the rights of the people involved
3. Some have attended to the causal structure of the case

Recent work by T. M. Scanlon,² as well as some older work by Judith Thomson,³ convinces me that the first approach is simply a lost cause.

Thomson has perhaps been the biggest advocate of the second approach. However, she herself now despairs of the possibility of explaining the moral difference between the cases by appeal to the concept of a right.⁴

F. M. Kamm has recently given the third approach a thoroughgoing treatment. Although I am not ultimately convinced by the principle she proposes in answer to the Trolley Problem (chiefly because it generates some bizarre results), her work is undoubtedly replete with insights. I found one insight of hers particularly arresting. She thinks that on the principle she proposes there “supervenes a moral distinction between substituting one person for another and subordinating one person to another.”⁵ She contends that “substitution is often permissible; and subordination is prima facie wrong.”⁶ I intend to take these concepts of substitution and subordination and explicate them in terms of the concept of a right. More generally, my hope is that I can use some of Kamm’s insights to help reinvigorate a rights-based approach to the Trolley Problem.

Daniel Wee

⁶ Ibid.
Does Rule-Following Necessarily Require Rejecting Platonism?

In his paper "The rule-follower and his community" (2004), Martin Gustafsson joins a long list of attempts to resolve two strands in tension in Wittgenstein's considerations on rule-following. The two strands are that Wittgenstein wants to (a) reject the 'Platonist' conception of rules, according to which what is in accordance with a rule is determined independently of what we regard as being in accordance with that rule, and (b) hold on to the 'seems right/is right' distinction in rule-following, i.e., that there is a conceptual distinction between obeying a rule and thinking that one is obeying the rule. Gustafsson claims that the tension between these two strands is only apparent. He argues that this is because sustaining the 'seems right/is right' distinction necessarily requires rejecting the 'Platonist' conception of rules, and therefore the two strands cannot be in tension. My aim is to outline and evaluate Gustafsson's attempt to resolve this tension. I shall argue that on closer inspection, it fails primarily because he misjudges the epistemology of rule-following under the 'Platonist' conception of rules. Consequently, the tension between these two strands is left without a satisfactory resolution.

Mark A. Winstanley.

History and Philosophy of Science Program, University of Melbourne, Australia

Between Social Norm and Individual Necessity – How Genetic Epistemology unites the Janus Faces of Logic.

Phenomenologically logic is a norm, in the descriptive and prescriptive sense of the word, for rational discourse with others. On the other hand, the compelling necessity experienced in logical arguments makes us attribute universal validity to logic. The former emphasises the effect of the whole on the parts and is in essence a sociological perspective on logic; the latter draws attention to the first-person experience and is in essence psychological. Strangely, however, it is not easy to reconcile these two perspectives. Reducing psychology to sociology, that is the part to the whole, makes the individual experience of necessity illusory since it is founded on the contingency of a social convention; reducing sociology to psychology, that is the whole to a sum of the parts, on the other hand, makes the prescriptive aspect of a norm unintelligible. Piaget proposes an alternative to the reductionist approaches – convergence. Without falling foul of logical psychologism, he conceives of propositional logic as a mental construct evolving in an individual's psyche. On the other hand, his view of discourse as the exchange of ideas represents a sociological position. Now, under certain circumstances, which will be set out in this paper, he claims that the distinct psychological and sociological processes converge on the same structure, called a groupement, which underlies both propositional logic and rational cooperation.