

Team Report – Foreign Fighters

Key Findings and Judgments

- The region around the southern Philippines is an active conflict zone with militia groups, specially those of radical Islamic ideologies. The island of Mindanao, where the suspects were arrested, has at least five local and one international active Islamic militia groups. Communist insurgents and violent drug operations are also active in the area.
- Target A is almost certainly (95-99%) to be a Malaysian foreign fighter who is involved in the Islamic militancy in Mindanao having traveled to the region to join the local militias.
- Target B is likely (55-80%) a tourist.
- Geo-location findings
 - Photo 1 was Certain (100%) taken in the region in Manado, North Sulawesi, Indonesia, At Cafe Warung Elso Samodara.
 - Photo 2 was almost certainly (95-99%) taken from the foredeck of the KM Ratu Maria while the vessel was facing Tahuna port.
 - Photo 3 was certain (100%) taken from the intersection of Pacheron Boulevard and West Side in General Santos City
 - Photo 4 was certain (100%) taken from Governor Lim Avenue in Zamboanga

Recommendations

Both suspects should remain in detention until further investigation is completed.

Even though it's likely (55-80%) that Target B is just a tourist, there is still the possibility that he may be involved in criminal or militant activities. In order to clarify that, we recommend that the investigation focus on the following points:

1. Mobile phone records for Target A and Target B should be obtained from the carrier and examined. Any communication between Target A and Target B should be assessed to determine the nature of the relationship.
2. Target B's phone and camera should be examined to search for evidence of any unusual activities inconsistent with being a tourist, and his relationship to Target A.
3. Target A and Target B should be interrogated to further investigate the content of their long conversations and the nature of their activities in the region.
4. The authenticity of Target B's passport should be verified and Target A's identity should be confirmed. Also, a profile on Arif Mangunsong, to whom the postcard is addressed, should be obtained.

If Target B is a tourist, it is very likely (80-95%) that Target A has tried to recruit him, therefore the Philippines and ICSSRC should register him on their database of potential militants.

Assessment of Current Islamic Militant activities And Foreign Fighter Movements In The Region Around The Southern Philippines

Militant movements in Southeast Asia, mostly connected to religious radicals and more specifically of Islamic roots, have become increasingly active in the last decades in the Philippines, mostly in the southern regions around Mindanao, Basilan, Jolo and other nearby islands.

Public transport and other gathering places, such as street markets, have been the favoured terrorist attack targets, however large-scale abductions and shootings have also been carried out by the groups, predominantly by Abu Sayyaf and the Rajah Solaiman Movement, two groups that had claimed responsibility for most of the attacks. (source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorism_in_the_Philippines)

Other groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah are active in the region as well (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jemaah_Islamiyah)

Also, there has been an increasing involvement of foreign fighters in the region:

"Foreign fighters in Southeast Asia have been the subject of growing focus, and raised particular concern in the 2017 siege of Marawi, where significant numbers of Indonesians and Malaysians were reported to have fought alongside Filipino militants." (source: <https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/the-demographics-of-southeast-asian-jihadism/>)

Also, tighter border security between Malaysia and Philippines have cut the Islamic militants from their main source of funding from international supporter, so they have been turning to drug related activities and kidnap-for-ransom to fund their organisation. (sources: <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/drug-trade-marawi-mindanao-philippines-islamic-state-maute-10574894>, retrieved 24 Feb 2020 and <https://www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2017/05/abu-eyeing-tourism-destinations-for-its-kidnap-for-ransom-activities/>)

See Appendix 5 for further detail

Geo-location and Movements



Locations of the Photographs From Target A's Phone

We have identified the exact locations depicted in two of the photos and the approximate location depicted in the other two. A full accounting of Geolocation methods and processes is provided in the Appendix.

Figure 1 Locations for photos from A's phone

	Location and confidence	Latitude and Longitude
Photo 1	Certain (100%) In Manado, North Sulawesi, Indonesia at Cafe Warung Elsa Samodara.	1.4957597,124.8549599
Photo 2	Almost certainly (95-99%) taken from the foredeck of the KM Ratu Maria while the vessel was facing Tahuna port.	3.602684,125.492621,15
Photo 3	Certain (100%) that is the intersection of Pacheron Boulevard and West Side in General Santos City.	6°06'26.0"N 125°10'39.3"E
Photo 4	Certain (100%) is Governor Lim Avenue, in the city of Zamboanga	6.9078095,122.0656532

Figure 2 Geo-location identification evidence

TARGET A PHOTO	GEO-LOCATION EVIDENCE
<p>Photo 1 from Target A's phone</p> 	<p>Screen shot of google streetview, matches photo1</p>  <p>In Manado, North Sulawesi, Indonesia, At Cafe Warung Elsa Samodara</p> <p>Google Map: location https://www.google.com.au/maps/@1.4957509,124.8550906,165m/data=!3m1!1e3</p>
<p>Photo 2 from Target A's phone</p> 	<p>The terrain in Photo 2 is identical to that in the following photo (Photo 2a) which is from Google Maps Streetview. I mountain range, town on the horizon, headland, and tower. Points of similarity are marked. This location is on the Maria at Tahuna Port on the Sangihe islands</p>  <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Photo 2A Google Satellite view of Tahuna Port. https://www.google.com/maps/@3.6033897,125.4966087,3572m/data=!3m1!1e3 • Google Streetview location - in middle of the bay. https://www.google.com/maps/@3.602684,125.492621, • Google Streetview photo from the middle of the bay. https://www.google.com/maps/@3.602684,125.492621,3a,75y,90t/data=!3m8!1e2!3m6!1sAF1QipM2JpIeNbm3pyZPea0wlZjhcb_FLUTk67z8!2e10!3e12!6shhttps:%2F%2F1h5.googleusercontent.com%2Fp%2FAF1IeNbm3pyZPea0wlZjhcb_FLUTk67z8%3Dw203-h114-k-no!7i4608!8i2592
<p>Photo 3 from Target A's phone</p> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Photo 3 was taken at 6°06'26.0"N 125°10'39.3"E, outside the General Santos City Market, on P.Acharon Bou General Santos City, South Cotabato, Philippines • Google Map location https://www.google.com/maps/@6.1072112,125.1775333,157m/data=!3m1!1e3 • It is a cropped version of the Google Streetview photo 
<p>Photo 4 from Target A's phone</p> 	<p>Placeholder for Geo-location evidence for Photo 4</p>



Movements of Target A and B

Figure 3: Map showing Sulu Sea and Celebes Sea area, indicating location of photos 2,3 and 4, and Dakak beach where Target A and Target B were arrested, and partial route of the KM Ratu Maria and known routes into Mindanao for foreign fighter .



Movements of Target A

The method used to determine a possible route taken by Target A was organising the pictures' locations from the most distant to the closest to Target's A current location. We assume that the photos have been taken in chronological order. Based on that and on the fact that this route also matches a known foreign fighter entry route to the Philippines, Target A is very likely to have traveled from Manado in Northern Sulawesi, Tahuna on the Sangihe Island (on the KM Ratu Maria) and then to General Santos City and Zamboanga, then to Dakak beach.

It's very likely that Target A traveled mostly by land and sea to avoid airports' more strict security checkpoints as a simple X-ray scan could reveal the weapons that he was smuggling into the Philippines.

At this stage, we were unable to determine possible routes that Target A used to cross the border from Malaysia to Indonesia - from Sangihe Island to General Santos city.

Targets A's route via the Sangihe islands is consistent with known routes for foreign fighters. (source: <https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/06/23/17/89-suspected-foreign-terrorists-in-mindanao-report>)

Figure 4 Map of Sulu Sea and Celebes Sea area, showing Locations of Photos 2,3,4




Movements of Target B

An annotated map was found in B's possession (list of evidences found by the local authorities are listed in the Appendix).

This map includes a line hand drawn along the road from Zamboanga to Dakak, with an X at Dakak, a star at Camiguin and a question mark at Samal. The line strongly implies a travel route, so it's very likely that B arrived in Zamboanga by plane and followed that route to Dakak by land. If true, that would indicate that Target A and Target B may have followed the same route from Zamboanga to Dakak and could even possibly have met before their encounter at the resort. At this stage, there is no evidence that A and B coordinated their travel.

Also, should Target B be a tourist, the marked spots on the map match snorkelling/diving locations as indicated by the map's legend and Google searches. Should Target B be involved with militias, those location could indicate possible attack targets.

Figure 5 Annotated map found in Target B's possession, showing his assumed travel route, and proposed locations to visit.



Assessment of Target A and Target B

It Is Almost Certain (95-99%) That Target A Has a Possible Role in Militant Activities

Assumptions:

- The information received from ICSSRSO is accurate
- The phone belongs to Target A

Reasoning:

Abel Badger has advised us that ICSSRSO's HUMINT sources suggest that Muhamad Sadili Nazrin bin Aizad, (Target A) has ties to militant Islamic groups on the island of Mindanao and in the larger region, but on further details were offered about that. We judge the information very credible as it is supported by the following evidences:

- The search of Target A's bungalow found some extremist pamphlets on the merits of martyrdom fighting unbelievers which could express the suspect's personal beliefs.
- The search of Target A's bungalow revealed weapons (AK-47 and some hand grenades) which are military grade and the AK-47 is considered a weapon of choice by modern Jihadist groups for its versatility and resistance to different kinds of environments and storage conditions. (source: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/29/why-jihadi-terrorists-swapped-suicide-belts-kalashnikov-ak-47s>). It's not proven that the weapons belong to Target A, but the circumstantial evidences point to that.
- At his arrest, Target A was attempting to erase his mobile phone. Although that is not an uncommon occurrence, the timing of the activity is consistent with an attempt of destroying compromising evidence, which could indicate that he was alerted about his upcoming arrest. At his stage we can't confirm if the suspect was alerted or not or who could have alerted him.
- There is no mention of a passport for Target A, which indicates that he may not have entered the country illegally and foreign fighters are known to use smuggling routes to enter the country.

It's not clear the purpose of Target A is in the Dakak Beach area, on Mindanao island. Possible reasons include:

- Very likely to join up with existing Islamic militants. The weapons and pamphlets support that.
- Likely to participate of a terrorist attack. The weapons support that. However, there is no other indicators of a terrorist attack plan. The intelligence for the plan could be in the mobile phone that the suspect attempted to delete.
- Smuggle weapons into the country. Smuggling is one of the main ways by which militias acquire weapons.
- To participate in kidnap-for-ransom or drug related activities as the militias are increasingly recurring to those methods as a source of funding.
- Recruitment. The long conversations and the pamphlets found with Target B could indicate an attempt of recruitment.

Also is possible that more than one of those theories or all of them could be true.

Although we consider extremely unlikely that Target A is innocent of being involved with the Islamic militants, we cannot eliminate this possibility.

The Relationship Between Targets A and B

Key Assumption: Based on our analysis of Target A, we assume Target A is most likely to be involved in Militant activities.

Considering that Target A is almost certainly an Islamic militant and that he engaged in the long conversations with Target B, as reported by the resort's staff which we believe to be credible, that would make Target B a suspect by association.

We have evaluated three possible scenarios and have assessed.

- Target B is likely (55-80%) a legitimate visitor to the country with no criminal purposes
- Target B is unlikely (20-45%) to be a Foreign Fighter
- Target B is very unlikely (5-20%) involved in other criminal activities such as drug dealing, kidnapping or weapon smuggling

Approach 1 - The Evidence Surrounding Target B's Arrest

Trusted Facts From ICSSRO

When Target B was arrested, he was found in possession of an annotated map, a written postcard, camouflage clothes, an Indonesian passport, a mobile phone, a Koran, pamphlets on Islam (ritual, ethics and practice), and the following equipment (which our research into snorkelling prompted by the postcard shows that these items are commonly used by divers but could also be used in military purposes as well): strap-on knife, leatherman, waterproof camera, diving compass, and backpack.

The postcard features a guide to diving locations amongst the pre-printed materials, and a handwritten letter describing diving activities, including problems with the diving mask which could explain the fact that the suspect shaved his beard on the following day of his arrival at the resort.

The annotated map of Mindanao, as mentioned before could indicate diving locations or attack targets depending on the innocence or guilt of the suspect.

Evidences of Target B's Innocence:

- Target B is a suspect by association with Target A, but besides their long conversations of which at the present moment the content is unknown, and the tools found in his possession, there are not other hard evidences that incriminate Target B. Also, it could be that during those conversations Target B became aware of Target A's extremist views and that he was the one who alerted the authorities. If that was the case, he would have done it anonymously for safety.
- Considering that there was a time window between Target A's arrest and Target B's arrest in which Target B could have fled or disposed of any material that could incriminate him and apparently he didn't, it's a strong evidence that he didn't consider himself a suspect and didn't see his arrest coming and that reinforces the theory that he was not involved in criminal activities.
- The postcard describes his snorkelling activities and plans to go diving and the fact that the belongs found in his possession are consistent with recreational activities (if Target B was associated with Target A, it would be expected that they had the same grade of weapons which is not the case). Also, the fact that he mentions issues with his snorkel mask is consistent with he shaving his beard (so mask could seal properly).
- The fact that he has a Koran and religious pamphlet could indicate that he is a traditional and devout person. Traditional because he could have a digital version of the Koran on this phone instead of bringing a hard copy.
- The fact that he hand wrote a postcard reinforces that he is a traditional person as this is a very traditional method of communication and the fact that he's addressing the card to his brother and his family indicates that he is a family man.
- Differently than Target A, no extremist pamphlets were found in his possession.
- If Target B was plotting something illegal with Target A, it would be expected that they would have those conversations in private not in public.

- The fact that the suspects were staying in different bungalows could indicate that they were not travelling together or that they were not associated to each other.

Evidences of Target B's Guilt:

- Association with Target A
- Equipment and gear that could be used for military activities
- The map in his possession indicates locations that could be possible target's for an attack, specially considering his long conversations with Target A.
 - Considering that there was a time window between Target A's arrest and Target B's arrest, Target B may have disposed of any material that could incriminate him.
 - The fact that he shaved his beard could indicate an attempt of keeping a low profile for criminal activities.
 - The fact that he has identical pamphlets found with Target A could indicate that they are associated with each other.
 - The fact that he has a Koran and religious pamphlets in his possession could be an indicative of radical inclinations.
 - The postcard could be an encrypted message destined to other militants or forged alibi in case of arrest.

Further investigation could support Target B's guilt if among other factors:

- If the passport is illegitimate.
- If his mobile phone contains incriminating evidence.
- If Target A incriminates Target B when interviewed
- If Target B's fingerprints are found on the weapons in Target A's possession
- If new HUMINT indicates that he is connected to militias or that a family member is.

Possible Militant Roles of Target B

If guilty, a possible militant role for Target B would be related to gathering intelligence. Target B's motivation for visiting dive locations could indicate intentions of blending in to observe tourists and their movements to choose possible targets for kidnap-for-ransom or drug related activities.

If our Key Assumption is inaccurate, then this would lower the likely hood of Target B being involved in militant activities.

Approach 2 Alternative approach

Target B is likely (55-80%)to be a Tourist

Target B appears to be a tourist:

- He has a passport, indicating legitimate travel to the Philippines
- He claims, on the post-card, to have been snorkeling, which is a tourist activity. The resort staff have reported that he shaved his beard, which would be required to properly fit a face-mask for snorkeling, which coroborate the claim on the postcard. The resort staff are considered credible for this, as they have no reason to lie, and it something they are likely to notice.
- The map is consistent with a tourist, with points of interest , at Dakah, Camiguin and a question mark at Samal, all of which are known for diving related activities (corroborated by icons on the Mindanao postcard.

However, he has had multiple long conversations (According to resort staff, credible) with Target A who is highly likely t be a foreign fighter/Islamic militant. This is more than casual contact between the two, and invites suspicion on Target Bs motives and support of extremist ideology.

The long conversations could be innocent: two people staying in a resort are likely to meet up, and they are both Muslim in a predominately Christian country, so could have things in common to discuss.

If Target B is a tourist, then there it is very likely (80-95%) that Target A has attempted to recruit Target B into extremist ideology. Tourist B appears to be a devout Muslim (possessing the Koran, and Islamic pamphlets), which may make him a recruitment target for Target A, who does have extremist pamphlets.

Target B is very unlikely (5-20%) as a Drug Trafficker

It is known that Islamic militants have been turning to kidnapping and drug trafficking in order to finance their activities, so Target B may be a drug trafficker negotiating with Target A.

Drug traffickers often hide in plain site as tourists, which Target B appears to be.

The long conversations may be negotiations between Target A and Target B in relation to drug trafficking. Negotiations may at early stages, so the lack of drugs or large amounts of cash does not eliminate this hypothesis.

The lack of evidence of drug trafficking negotiations is not surprising as we would expect them to take care to avoid documenting these negotiations.

However, we have no link between Target B and drug trafficking activities.

An examination of the Target Bs phone records may show contact with Target A that is consistent with drug trafficking negotiations.

Target B is unlikely (20-45%) to be a Foreign Fighter

Target B appears to be a devout Muslim (possessing the Koran and Islamic pamphlets) so he may be here meeting up with Islamic militants, in particular with Target A.

However, he does not have any other link to extremist ideology. He does not have the extremist pamphlets that Target A has, and his knives, though they are weapons, are not consistent with the weapons held by Target A (Ak-47 and hand grenades).

His interest and activities in snorkeling are not consistent with a person attempting to make contact with an extremist Islamic group.

The pamphlets on Islamic culture, practice and rituals were found in both Target A and Target B's possession, but these pamphlets are not indicative of a relationship between them. They could have been picked up from the same mosque.

Target B has Equipment and gear (backpack, knife, Leatherman Wave, compass) that could be used for military activities however these items are just as common for tourists, particularly those who plan snorkelling and diving activities.

APPENDIX

Note about the questions addressed in this report:

This report aimed to answer the following questions:

1. Assess the current Islamic militant activities and foreign fighter movements in the region around the southern Phillipines
2. Identify the locations of the photographs retrieved from Target A's phone
3. Assess how those photos might be related to your analysis of militant movements and activities in the region.
4. Possible role in militant activities of Target A and Target B
5. The nature of the relationship between them.

Appendix 1. Determining Consensus on Target B

The following survey was used to consult with team members, to determine a consensus to the likelihood ratings of the three main hypothesis associated with Target B

These hypothesis are MECE, so the total should be 100% - average of each rating

	Target B is a tourist (regardless of whether he is being recruited or not) This includes Business trip, visiting family or friends and other "innocent" purposes	Target B is a Drug Trafficker (with no personal interest in FF, not follower or supporter of the extremist ideology)	Target B is a Foreign Fighter (this includes where Target B is both FF and DT, ie is a supporter/follower of the extremist ideology)
Emu I am not fixed in this ratings. (102.5% total but there is wiggle room in those ranges)	Roughly even chance (45-55%) Tourists are common.	roughly even chance (45-55%) Because we know FF are getting involved in drug trade Because long conversations would be necessary Because Tourist is a simple cover	almost no chance (1-5%) Foreign fighter and snorkeling are inconsistent
Goanna	55-80% The evidence reflects that he is on a diving/adventure holiday. Lack of evidence and ties to FF.	5% - No evidence to prove this connection	20-45% Target B's long conversations with Target A - Of all the people in the hotel to talk with, he talks with a FF suspect <i>If you were in his place, would you be able to tell who's a FF or not? (gecko)</i>
Tassie	Likely: 80% The evidence is not conclusive, but it is strongly indicative	Very unlikely 1%: Even less evidence for this than foreign fighter	Very unlikely 5%: Due to high impact, needs to be investigated further. Evidence currently is very slim.
Dingo	Roughly even chance 50%	Unlikely 25%	Improbable 40%
Gecko	Highly probable 75% The only thing incriminating about Target B is that he was seen in long conversations with someone who is highly probable to be a foreign fighter.	Highly improbable: 5% While drugs is a source of funding for militias, there's absolutely no indication that Target B is involved with drugs.	Unlikely: 20% Besides a few objects found in Target B's possession and his conversations with Target A, there's no real indication that he is a foreign fighter. Also if he was, the expected behaviour would for him to have fled when Target A was arrested or at least get rid of his phone, which he didn't and that testifies for his innocence.
Budgerigar	Unlikely 20% Remote 5% Lack of evidence to substantiate this position.	Likely 75% Contextually i think it is likely he is involved in terror related activities. While the evidence doesn't point to it, the circumstances could - see my resource on Base Rate Neglect	

	Target B is a tourist	Target B is a Drug Trafficker	Target B is a Foreign Fighter
Average of above assessments	57%	15%	30%

	Target B is a tourist	Target B is a Drug Trafficker	Target B is a Foreign Fighter
FINAL ASSESSMENT	likely (55-80%)	Very unlikely (4-20%)	Unlikely (20-45%)

Appendix 2. Geo-location Method

General Method of analysis for Geolocation:

- Looking for clues and features in each photograph that may be unique or specific to a region/area.
- Using google maps to explore regions of interest.
- Using google street view (the yellow man) to explore specific areas in more detail
- Using google search engine, Youtube, Facebook and articles in blogs and websites to gather more information

Evidence for and against Photo #1 location in Manado, Indonesia:

Number	For:	Against:
1	Photo 2: KM Ratu Maria arriving (or leaving?) Tahuna. See link - Indicates that there is a regular ferry route from Manado - Tahuna on KM Ratu Maria: https://sangiheislands.weebly.com/	The KM Ratu Maria may come from elsewhere, however we have no evidence of this.
2	Manado has many Churches with Large Crosses atop.	Many other small villages on route to Tahuna and other small Islands within the area also have a number of churches. There are also many Churches in the Philippines, there is a possibility the photo was taken there.
3	Manado has many very similar communication towers to the one in Photo 1.	Other villages/towns in the region also have communication towers, however, not as many and in some areas have a different appearance.
4	Sign written in Indonesian on the left side of the image which reads in English: Tax = Corruption	
5	Djarum Super mild is a brand of Indonesian cigarettes.	Also sold in the Philippines https://www.djarum.com/brands/international-brands/
6		Car and motorbike parked on the right side of the road - Indonesians drive on the left side (Philippines on the right side) But is driving on the left a guarantee that they will park on the left? Expatriates complain that Indonesians often park illegally.
7	Landscape/Terrain in Manado in the more rural and mountainous areas are similar to photo 1.	Other rural areas in parts of Indonesia show similar terrain to photo 1.
8		Cannot find the location in Manado after searching for many (many, many) hours.

Method of analysis for Photo 1:

- The general method is to type in the name of the place and "Churches" so that all of the churches in the city are visible in google maps. Then place the little yellow man near that area and wonder around looking for a cross that has similar features to the one in photo #1. Also look for communication towers that are within close range and study the likeness of these to the one in Photo #1. We have researched crosses/crucifixes and have found 2 near Manado (Bukit Kashish https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Christian_cross_on_top_of_Bukit_Kasih.JPG & Salib Warembungan <https://detikmanado.com/nikmati-indahnyakota-manado-dari-puncak-bukit-makatete-hills/>) that are fixed to a hill. Neither of them appear to be the cross we are looking for.
- Another method is to walk the streets to look for similar terrain and communication towers.
- Alternative theories are that the cross is not of a religious nature and therefore not linked to a church, or/and that the photo was not taken in Indonesia.

Geolocation of photo 1 has been very challenging, with many hours spent searching for this location.



Visible in the photo:

- A forested hillside with a radio mast and large crucifix visible above the trees.
- A mud-covered street with buildings on either side, some buildings have heavily rusted roofs, others are in considerably better condition.
- An advertising banner for Djarum Super MLD cigarettes, with letters "PERIN" visible at the bottom of the banner before being cut off at the edge of the photo.
- **Peringatan: Merokok Membunuhmu** Google Translate says 'Warning: Smoking kill you' Dingo7
- There is a blue handwritten sign on a roadside stand. It is believed that the sign says "Tax = Corruption" in Bahasa Indonesian.
- Man in the picture has dark skin which is a typical characteristic of the population of Eastern Indonesia.

The lamp post and houses architecture match those found in Manado and surrounding areas.

We have searched in the Philippines and Malaysia, but couldn't find similar characteristics.

Also the fact that Target B took the KM Ratu Maria and the vessel departs from Manado reinforces the theory that the picture was taken somewhere in Eastern Indonesia and most likely in the region of Manado.

Djarum Super is a popular Indonesian made cigarette

Photos 2, 3, and 4 were taken at port cities. Photo 4 was taken closest to Dakak beach, in Zamboanga. Photo 3 was taken further away (but still on Mindanao Island) in General Santos City. Photo 2 was probably taken in waters near Tahuna port, partway between Northern Sulawesi and Mindanao. The ferry to Tahuna from Norther Sulawesi departs from Manado, and our geolocation search has focused on Manado and the islands between Manado and Tahuna. Due to the number of Christian churches in Manado, the complexity of the terrain, we have not been able to prove that the photo was or was not taken in Manado.

We also found photos in the region with a similar motifs to the location we are looking for:



<https://www.google.ca/maps/@1.3952311,124.6791553,3a,20.1y,165.63h,112.25t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sZa7HqPV-ssw6juYSr8nGQw!2e0!7i16384!8i8192>

Searches via Google Maps using a 'use overhead view to locate churches, then street view to confirm' method have covered the following areas:

Indonesia

Manado

Tahuna

Bitung

Manadotua Island

Mentehage Island
Naegbesar Island
Biaro Island
Thulandang Island
Siau Island
Para Island
Karakitang Island
Kalama Island
Sangihe Island
Kararuang Island
Urung
Karakelons Island

North Maluku -Hiri Island, Tidore, Ternate, Moti Island, Tobelo, Morotai Island, Maba, Misio, Poan, Palmea

Philippines:

Sarangani Island
Balut Island
General Santos City
Davao City
Island Garden City of Samal
Zamboanga
Basilin Island
Ipil
Sindangar
Dakak
Mindanao
Camiguin Island
Basilian Island

Method of analysis for Photo 2:

The KM Ratu Maria

The Photo 2 is taken on a boat, and equipment on the foredeck is labelled "KM Ratu Maria". Equipment on boat is usually labelled with the name of the boat.

Google searches for KM Ratu Maria, resulted the confirmation of this boat, and photos of places it goes to. The route of the KM Ratu Maria was searched for, but was hard to pin down. A couple of locations on its route were found, and a closer look was taken in those ports.

The route of the KM Ratu Maria

Tahuna port is a stopping point for the KM Ratu Maria.


On photo 2 we can see two particular points of interest. A distinctive blue roof and an antenna.




Which appear to match the relative positions of the mosque and antenna at Tahuna Port (photo source <http://wisatasangihe.blogspot.com/2016/02/kota-tahuna.html>)



There is an antenna in Tahuna Port which appears to match the structure in Photo 2.





The mosque:



Video 2: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4FnR-S8h17U>

A zoomed in screenshot, zoomed in, from Video 2 show as distinctive blue minaret.



A zoomed in section of photo 2, showing a potential match to building with distinctive blue minaret



Eventually a google map photo was found taken in the middle of bay, whic provides a similar view as Photo 2. The shorlien in Photo 2 is very distant, but a comparison of features including antenna, silhouette of the mountains, a jetty, and the silhoete of a foreground promontory, indicates an extremely close match.

It is almost certain (95-99%) that this is the same location as Photo 2.

Similar landscape in Tahuna and antenna.

<https://www.google.com/maps/@3.6009405,125.4937883,5039m/data=!3m1!1e3>



- Photo 2A Google Satellite view of Tahuna Port. <https://www.google.com/maps/@3.6033897,125.4966087,3572m/data=!3m1!1e3>
- Google Streetview location - in middle of the bay. <https://www.google.com/maps/@3.602684,125.492621,15z>
- Google Streetview photo from the middle of the bay. https://www.google.com/maps/@3.602684,125.492621,3a,75y,90t/data=!3m8!1e2!3m6!1sAF1QipM2JpmZj-leNbm3pyZPea0wLzjhcb_FLUTk67z8!2e10!3e12!6shttps:%2F%2Fh5.googleusercontent.com%2Fp%2FAF1QipM2JpmZj-leNbm3pyZPea0wLzjhcb_FLUTk67z8%3Dw203-h114-k-no!7i4608!8i2592

Method of analysis for Photo 3:

Photo 3 was taken at 6°06'26.0"N 125°10'39.3"E, outside the General Santos City Market, on P.Acharon Boulevard, General Santos City, South Cotabato, Philippines

Photo 3 is a cut down version of the Google street view photo at Google Map location <https://www.google.com/maps/@6.1073417,125.1774871,157m/data=!3m1!1e3>


Figure: Photo 3 on Target A's phone



Figure: Google Street view photo from



street location and direction of Photo 3 - arrow indicates photo location



Method of analysis for Photo 4:

Photo 4 was taken on Governor Lim avenue, Zamboanga

Location is: Governor Lim Avenue, in the city of Zamboanga, on the island of Mindanao.

Geolocation: [6.9078095,122.0656532](https://www.google.com/maps/@6.9078095,122.0656532),

Google Map location : <https://www.google.com/maps/@6.9078095,122.0656532,17z>

Photo 4 matches the [This Google street view image](#) is nearly identical to Photo 4. (Photo 4 is cut down extract of the google streetview photo)

Figure: Google Street view at this location



Figure: Photo 4 from Target A's Phone



Location method for Photo 4

Because photo 3 was closer to Dakak beach than Photo 2, Photo 4 was assumed to be closer to Dakak beach than Photo 3. The salient features of photo 4 are:

- a roadway that is directly adjacent to a body of water
- a church by the side of the roadway

Google Maps was zoomed in on the coast of Mindanao Island, and the word 'Church' was given as a search parameter. This caused churches to be marked with pins on the map. "Update results when map moves" was selected, and then the view was scrolled around the coastline, looking for churches near the water. Cities located in between General Santos City and Dakak Beach (Cotabato and Pagadian) were the initial focus of the search, which expanded to Davao City. Then the North coast from Dapitan City to Surigao City was searched. Immediately upon including Zamboanga in the search, the area immediately West of Zamboanga Port was immediately notable for the wide roadway adjacent to the water, the curvature of the coastline, and the possibility that Zamboanga Port was the industrial/port zone in the background of the photo. Street View examination took place just West of the Carmelite Church, and was immediately rewarded with the image linked above.

Appendix 3. Post Card Analysis:

The handwriting on the postcard was entered into Google Translate, which detected the language as Indonesian. The result from Google Translate was pasted below, and has been revised after review by an Indonesian speaker.

No pen marks were apparent on the picture side of the postcard. There is no stamp or date either. As there is no date, we do not know when this postcard was written, therefore we don't know when 'yesterday' was that Target B went snorkeling.

Dear Arif,

I hope this card reaches you. I feel very happy in Mindanao.

The weather is perfect. I also snorkelled yesterday and it was very impressive

- lots of beautiful fishes and coral reefs!

At first, it was a bit of a problem when trying on the mask, but all was overcome well.

Planning to go diving if possible I'll send you a picture!

Say hello to your family.

Sending warm regards

Your brother, Fadhlan

Appendix 4. Evidence Table

This is used to assess the credibility of information we are given.

[lens kit page on evidence tables](#)

INFORMATION	CREDIBILITY RATING	REASONS FOR CREDIBILITY RATING
Photos are from a suspected person who was arrested	high	Source is ICSSRSO , who have high credibility
Target A has ties to militant Islamic groups on the island of Minanao and in the larger region	Moderate	"HUMINT sources suggest that ... Target A .. has ties to militant Islamic groups." This is not confirmed information.
Target A was alerted minutes before his arrest	Moderate	source: we are told Target A was attempting to erase photos as he was apprehended. But many people delete photos from their phones. No information is provided as to who would alert Target A or why.
Target A staying at a cheap resort, near Dakak beach	high	Source: resort staff They have no reason to lie Can be checked with resort management
Target A and Target B have had long conversations multiple times over the last couple of days	High	source: staff at the cheap resort. They have no reason to say this if it was not true. If some staff were aware of a terrorist plot, and supported it, they would not have provided this information. however other staff would have, so there would have been no point in lying Note: the staff have not mentioned hearing the conversations.
Target A has been at the resort for at least three days	High	Source: staff at the resort, Credible They say he has been talking with Target B over the last three days, so he was there at least three days ago.
Target B arrived at resort three days ago	high	Source: Staff at the resort, Credible. Should be easy to confirm by checking with resort management.
Target B arrived bearded but shaved on his second day	HIGH	Source: resort cafe staff credible No reason to lie It is not surprising that staff would notice and remember this.
Target B is staying in a different bungalow	HIGH	Source: resort staff. Credible This would be easy to confirm with the resort management. Target B and his possessions were not found when A's room was searched. Target B's possession are in a different bungalow.
Postcard has not yet been sent (from Target B to Arif	high	if it had been sent, we would not have found it.
Postcard is intended for Arif, who is Fadhlan's brother	moderate	source: The postcard itself. It is addressed to Arif It is signed off "Your brother, Fadhlan". (Brother is a term often used for friends in the Muslim world.) Is this postcard to be sent or has Target B prepared it in case he is arrested?

INFORMATION	CREDIBILITY RATING	REASONS FOR CREDIBILITY RATING
Target B was snorkeling yesterday	Moderate	the postcard (written by Target B) refers to snorkeling yesterday, however we do not know when he wrote the card (yesterday or today)
Target B has been snorkeling	moderate	The postcard from Target B to Arif says that he has been snorkeling, and saw lots of fish and coral. This should be easy to verify, because he has waterproof digital camera, which we expect would be used to take photos during the snorkeling expedition. But he may not have used the camera on this first snorkel. If he did not go snorkeling, then potentially this postcard is a form of secret communication The map in his possession shows areas highlighted which are also known for snorkeling. If went snorkeling with others, this should be easy to verify via witnesses.

Appendix 5: OS information on Militant Activities in the Philippines

Assessment of current Islamic militant activities and foreign fighter movements in the region around the southern Philippines:

Figure (below) is the Australian Government travel warning, at 23 February 2020. This advice is reiterated by many governments worldwide, including Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. This warning may have particular relevance to travellers having a Western appearance. Source: www.smarttraveller.gov.au/destinations/asia/philippines

Do not travel to central and western Mindanao, including the Zamboanga Peninsula, and the Sulu Archipelago and Sulu Sea area.

Do not travel to:

- central and western Mindanao, including the Zamboanga Peninsula
- the Sulu Archipelago and southern Sulu Sea area

due to the very high threat of terrorism and kidnapping.

See [Safety](#)

Summary of the "War on the Rocks" article, dated 5 September 2018, supplied by Abel Badger:

<https://www.warontherocks.com/2018/09/the-demographics-of-southeast-asian-jihadism/>

1. The car-bombing on 31 July 2018, which killed ten people at a military checkpoint outside Lamitan City in the Philippines' Basilan province, which was the first time that Islamic State had "claimed a foreign fighter, a Moroccan national, was involved in an attack in the Philippines in official statements."
2. The article went on to discuss a data set of 242 individuals involved in jihadist activity in Southeast Asia, particularly during the 2017-18 period. Drawing upon open-source materials, an attempt was made to collect data on nationality, country of primary activity, age, sex, kinship ties, education, military history, place of origin, and history of prison radicalisation.
3. The article notes the growing role played by women in the jihadist movement, especially in Indonesia. Of the 242 individuals in the data set, 15 percent were female. The average age of Southeast Asian jihadists was around 31 years. It sees the Philippines as critical to regional jihadist efforts, noting the five-month-long Marawi siege in 2017, and that Islamic State has called for Southeast Asians who were unable to travel to Syria to instead fight in the Philippines.
4. Importantly, it notes that Indonesian jihadists also have a history of travelling to the Philippine region of Mindanao, which has served as a training ground, transit point, and sanctuary for jihadists.
5. Of the 242 individuals in the data, 74 had documented familial connections with other members of jihadist groups, commonly through marriage and parent-child relationships. Various jihadist groups recognise the benefits of kinship ties, such as loyalty.
6. Topics also covered include the radicalisation of prison populations, noting that Influential jihadists like Abu Bakar Bashir and Aman Abdurrahman have been able to radicalise other inmates, and even plan and direct attacks from prison. The education system is also discussed, concluding that attendance of Southeast Asian schools with extremist ideologies increases the likelihood of involvement in jihadist activity, and that a number attended schools connected to or founded by prominent Indonesian jihadist Abu Bakar Bashir.
7. Finally, the article points out that Mindanao has long been plagued by conflict and discontent, dating back to the period of Spanish colonisation. The region has a high proportion of Muslims in an otherwise overwhelmingly Catholic country. Mindanao and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in particular are some of the poorest regions in the Philippines.

Figure 2. Illustrating the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao



Image source: edition.cnn.com

Open Source materials:

www.benarnews.org › indonesian › terror-forecast-01092020171951 Dated 9 January 2020

www.vaticannews.va › news › philippines-terrorist-attack-cotabato Dated 24 December 2019

thediplomat.com › 2019/10 › kidnapping-in-the-sulu-sea-implications... Dated 4 October 2019

<https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3033658/southeast-asia-alert-isis-grand-agenda-escaped-indonesian> Dated 19 October 2019

From the four links (above) we have compiled the following synopsis:

1. The Philippines is plagued by violent insurgencies, including a Muslim-led separatist uprising in Mindanao that has killed some 100,000 people. Though a landmark peace deal with the largest of the rebel groups, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, was sealed in 2019, a number of factions were excluded. They include the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and Abu Sayyaf, a kidnap-for-ransom gang that has been behind some of the nation's deadliest attacks.
2. Abu Sayyaf has long been based on the remote and forested terrain along the southern Philippine islands. The group is reported to have earned several million dollars from kidnappings, bombings and ambushes, often targeting foreigners. In certain instances, the group has beheaded hostages when ransom money was not paid.
3. Islamic groups in Mindanao have a track record of releasing false information as part of opportunistic attempts to gain attention and financing. BIFF is known to routinely issue warnings of imminent attacks and bombings in North Cotabato and Maguindanao in order to instill fear.
4. In December 2019, 2 people were killed and 35 wounded in Cotabato after a bomb went off outside a shopping mall, which was also blamed on ISIL-linked groups. In January 2019, 27 people were killed and 777 wounded when two bombs exploded during Sunday mass at the cathedral on Jolo Island, an area considered a stronghold of Islamist militants.
5. Earlier, in May 2017, pro-ISIL gunmen attacked and seized the city of Marawi, sparking a five-month battle that left more than 1,000 people dead. During the siege, many regional and non-regional fighters were smuggled through the Sulu archipelago to participate in the conflict. IS emir Isnilon Hapilon was killed near the end of the Marawi siege. The Sulu archipelago's re-emergence as a terrorism hotspot has coincided with the emergence of Hajan Sawadjaan as the potential leader of IS in the Philippines.
6. It is predicted that Mindanao will remain a desired destination for aspiring foreign fighters from Southeast Asia and beyond, with eastern Malaysia's Sabah state used by militants as a transit route to the nearby southern Philippines. Access to the seas allows insurgents to diversify their fundraising methods to meet their goals. In this regard, kidnappings are easier to pull off at sea due to the sheer vastness of such water bodies, which can hinder the ability of security agencies to detect and respond to attacks promptly. The area's vulnerable geography also means sea-based bandits are able to vanish into the cluster of Sulu islands to evade capture.
7. Access to the sea allows terrorists to also import and export resources and capabilities. For example, IS Sulu has used the Sulu seas to transport foreign fighters around the region. Such fighters both supplement and enhance the tactical capabilities of local terrorist groups. The Mindanao region, for example, has historically been used for training by terrorists after Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) developed a tactical alliance with Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation front at the turn of the century.
8. Southeast Asian nations are on high alert for about 50 Indonesian Islamic State fighters and their family members who could be tasked with carrying out the terror network's "grand agenda" of destroying the region's secular governments following their escape from Syrian prisons. Terrorism experts say ISIS has been turning its attention to weaponising fake news, which it sees as an easy and cost-free way to help undermine and delegitimise authorities in the region. According to Noor Huda Ismail, visiting fellow at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore "ISIS has no plan but to destroy the secular system in the whole of Southeast Asia".

<https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/inquirer/keeping-islamic-state-terrorists-at-bay-in-indonesia/news-story/198ec83d060718ac23d5cf679f522c1a>

This article details the movements of Islamic jihadists entering Malaysia via a southern seafaring route. The Sangihe Islands (see Figure 3) have become a halfway point for Islamic State militants hoping to reach The Philippines to undertake training and partake in terror-related activities. These foreign fighters catch the ferry from Madano in North Sulawesi to the Sangihe Islands, the closest Indonesian islands to the southern sea border of The Philippines. From here this article documents the journey by fishing boat of these foreign fighters, smuggled by Sangihese fishermen who take money and don't ask questions. In recent years Indonesian and Malaysian military have had a much stronger presence in the region, which may have slowed the number of foreign fighters using these channels, but it is unlikely that it has altogether halted.

<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/philippines-british-man-wife-abducted-gunmen-tukuran-a9144146.html>

This article is from October 2019. A British man and his Filipino wife were abducted from a beach resort in southern Mindanao. They were kidnapped from inside their beach hut accommodation, dragged across the beach and put into two boats by four armed men before they sped off in opposite directions. Two of the men had checked into the hotel days earlier. Military crackdowns on similar kidnappings have reduced the number of incidences, but they still occur, particularly in this part of the country. Attacks like this one are linked to ransom-seeking militant groups, who may or may not have links to larger terrorist organisations

version: 1.23

