Mohammad Mahdi Sadrforati

Conceptual change in science first became a hot topic five decades ago, when questions were raised about rationality and progress through scientific change. The first and most well-known approach to explaining conceptual change was to explain the rationality and progress of science in terms of the stability of reference. Scientific realists have embraced this referential approach. In the first years of the twenty-first century, however, a younger generation of philosophers, mainly philosophers of biology, argued against the referential approach in favour of a non-representational approach. In this thesis, I evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of this new approach to conceptual change. I argue that it raises valid objections to the referential approach, but it fails to explain communication and to fully vindicate rationality and progress in science. After showing the philosophical shortcomings of this new approach, I articulate a framework for evaluating the adequacy of an account of conceptual change. I then briefly sketch a possible way to meet the desiderata on an adequate account of conceptual change.

Supervisors: Associate Professor Howard Sankey, Dr Laura Schroeter