This July – the High Court’s winter recess – has seen six lengthy hearings concerning legal action on behalf of passengers of a boat from India who have spent the balance of the month detained in an Australian government vessel. Continue reading
On 18 July 2014, I was able to interview Sir Anthony Mason as we were both attending Obligations VII Conference in Hong Kong.
Sir Anthony was a judge of the High Court of Australia from 1972 to 1987, and Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia from 1987 to 1995. He then became a non-permanent judge of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, a position which he still holds.
We spoke about his roles as a judge in Australia and Hong Kong, significant judgments during his time as a High Court judge, the role of dissenting judgments, the use of academic commentary and overseas judgments, the doctrine of precedent and Farah v Say-Dee, and judgment writing styles.
KB: Thanks so much for agreeing to speak to me today.
AM: It’s a pleasure, Katy.
KB: The first thing I’d like to ask is: how would you view your time on the High Court?
AM: I enjoyed it very much. I suppose I can say I enjoyed being a judge.
AM: In one sense I regarded it as great fun. It was of course at times onerous, but I always enjoyed it. The questions were interesting and it was interesting endeavouring to answer the questions.
KB: And on that note, obviously you haven’t still given up being a judge. What about your time on the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal? (See also The Hon Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal’ (2001) 2 Melbourne Journal of International Law 216.)
AM: Likewise, I’ve enjoyed that very much. There are two different, or two aspects of that that are different from sitting in the High Court. First of all I am sitting on the CFA as a part-time judge. It’s more enjoyable being a part-time judge than a full-time one. Of course you don’t feel that sense of grind which you feel at times if you’re a permanent judge sitting on a court over a long period of time. But the second feature of sitting on the CFA is that I began sitting on that Court at the time when courts began to interpret the provisions of the Basic Law of Hong Kong’s Constitution. And it’s very different interpreting the provisions of a new Constitution at the very beginning from interpreting the provisions of an old Constitution after a lot of, as it were, work has already been done on it. You feel at times in the medium of the High Court that you’ve got to contend with a lot of overburden. You never have that feeling in Hong Kong. And the great thing about it is that it instils in you a sense of history and appreciation of the work done by those great judges who were the first High Court judges. I mean, they were remarkably good judges. They quickly established a reputation for the High Court as one of the leading courts in the world, and what’s more, they stood up to the Privy Council, and in their first big confrontation with the Privy Council they won out, and you should never forget their contribution to the development of Australian democracy and to the Australian Constitution. (See Deakin v Webb  HCA 57.) Continue reading
This week brought important developments in two significant proceedings that will soon be heard by the High Court: the urgent litigation over the fate of approximately 150 Sri Lankan asylum seekers held in an Australian cargo vessel; and the constitutional challenge to Queensland’s ‘bikie’ laws. Continue reading
Canadian journalist Catherine Clark, the daughter of a former Prime Minister and the host of Beyond Politics (shown on Canada’s public affairs cable channel) has conducted video interviews with the entire bench of the Supreme Court of Canada. Each runs for nearly 30 minutes. There are only eight interviews, as the Court’s ninth seat was unoccupied until recently (for reasons explained here). The interviews are available online at the website of Beyond Politics and on the show’s youtube channel (see the end of the list). In her interview, the current Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin reveals that she received the phone call offering her a place on the court while vacationing with her twelve-year old in Townsville.
Clark’s interviews resemble video interviews given by all sitting judges of the United States Supreme Court in 2009 on CSPAN. The American and Canadian Supreme Courts’ willingness to give interviews while on the bench contrasts with the general practice of Australia’s High Court, which is generally limited to rare interviews with the Chief Justice on special occasions, such as impending retirement [UPDATE: see comment below.] Last year, The Australian reported that the Court’s current Chief Justice, Robert French, has ruled out any media interviews before he retires in 2017.
By Houston Ash
While the legality of the Australian government’s policy of transferring Sri Lankan asylum seekers to that country’s navy is likely to be considered by the High Court shortly, a separate challenge to another pillar of the government’s migration strategy was recently dismissed. In Plaintiff S156/2013 v Minister of Immigration and Border Protection  HCA 22, the High Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) under which asylum seekers are removed from Australia’s ‘migration zone’ to either Papua New Guinea or the Republic of Nauru. The Court also confirmed the validity of the decisions made by the Minister of Immigration and Border Protection to designate PNG as a ‘regional processing country’ and to direct officers of what is now the Department of Immigration and Border Protection to take particular classes of ‘unauthorised maritime arrivals’ to PNG or Nauru.
The provisions in question, ss 198AB and 198AD of the Migration Act, were introduced by the Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and Other Measures) Act 2012 (Cth). As discussed further below, these provisions were the Parliament’s response to the High Court’s decision in Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship  HCA 32, which scuppered the former government’s so-called ‘Malaysia Solution’.
The challenged provisions
Section 198AD of the Migration Act requires ‘unlawful non-citizens’ who are also ‘unauthorised maritime arrivals’ to be taken to a ‘regional processing country’ as soon as reasonably practicable. If there are two or more such countries, s 198AD(5) requires the Minister to provide a written direction specifying the country to which a person or class of persons is to be taken. Section 198AB allows the Minister, by legislative instrument, to designate that a country is a ‘regional processing country’ if the Minister thinks it is in the national interest to do so. In considering the national interest, the Minister must have regard to whether the country has given any assurances that it:
- (a) Will not expel the person to a country where his or her life or freedom would be threatened; and
- (b) Will permit an assessment of whether the person is a refugee within the meaning of art 1A of the Refugees Convention.
Section 198AB(4) provides that any such assurances do not need to be legally binding. Continue reading
By Benjamin Saunders
This post makes some additional comments about the Court’s reasoning with respect to executive power (the subject of an earlier post by Cheryl Saunders (no relation to the author)) and also briefly discusses the Commonwealth waiving debts owed to it as a consequence of the Court’s finding of invalidity.
Executive power, British and Australian
I do not disagree with the opinions expressed by Cheryl Saunders in her earlier post, that ‘Williams [No 2] does not add a great deal of substance to the conclusions about the ambit of the executive power of the Commonwealth reached in Williams [No 1]’. However, I wish to make some additional observations, namely that the Court in Williams [No 2] reached its decision about the scope of executive power in an unusual way. Continue reading
Media reports state that the High Court has issued an injunction preventing the Australian navy from handing over approximately 150 people, said to have travelled by boat to seek asylum in Australia, to Sri Lankan officials. This follows confirmation by the Australian government of an incident involving 41 people:
Forty one potential illegal maritime arrivals who were intercepted on the SIEV were returned to Sri Lankan authorities yesterday (Sunday 6 July). The 41 Sri Lankan nationals were transferred at sea, in mild sea conditions from a vessel assigned to Border Protection Command (BPC) to Sri Lankan authorities, just outside the Port of Batticaloa. All persons intercepted and returned were subjected to an enhanced screening process, as also practised by the previous government, to ensure compliance by Australia with our international obligations under relevant conventions.
The Australian reports that the injunction was granted by Crennan J in an urgent hearing this evening and will apply until 4pm tomorrow, by which time a further hearing will have occurred.
A possible precedent for the reported injunction is an interim injunction granted by Hayne J on 7 August 2011 to prevent the first transfer of asylum seekers from Christmas Island to Malaysia under the ‘Malaysian Solution’. Continue reading
The High Court has upheld a challenge to the validity of the Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrival) Regulation 2013 (Cth), known as the PPV Regulation, in two related matters. The Court held the Minister’s determinations in relation to Plaintiffs S297/2013 and M150/2013 were invalid and issued a writ of mandamus in each instance directing the Minister to consider and determine each visa application according to law. Continue reading
A recent Essential Poll records that Australia’s most trusted institution is the High Court of Australia. 20% of the 1835 people surveyed said that they placed “a lot of trust” in the High Court” and 37% said that they placed “some trust” in the High Court. The High Court outstripped all other institutions, but was closely followed by the ABC. The High Court also had the lowest level of distrust, with only 12% of respondents saying that they had “no trust” in the High Court. Political parties scored the lowest in the 2014 poll, with only 2% of people saying that they placed “a lot of trust” in political parties and 11% of people saying that they placed “some trust” in political parties. 50% of people said that they had “no trust” in political parties. Continue reading
Last week, the High Court held two directions hearings in Kuczborski v The State of Queensland, the long-expected constitutional challenge to multiple laws enacted by the Queensland Parliament in the early hours of 16th October last year as a response to a Gold Coast ‘brawl’ nineteen days earlier. In last Monday’s hearing, Keane J revealed that the High Court hoped to schedule the full hearing in Brisbane in the first week of September. Queensland’s new Solicitor-General, noting that the case would require a day of arguments each by the challenger and Queensland and may attract interventions from many other Attorneys-General, suggested that the hearing would take ‘at least three days’. A four-day hearing would be the second one this year. As I noted last month on the chaplaincy hearing’s fourth day, the two previous four-day matters in the High Court were in 2009 and 2006.
The length of this matter may be less to do with its significance or controversy, and rather is likely due to the number of laws being challenged and the number of grounds. Continue reading
The High Court has allowed an appeal against the decision of the Full Federal Court in FTZK. FTZK is an asylum seeker who was accused of involvement in a kidnapping-murder while he was in China, an accusation he claims was motivated by his religious practices. Continue reading
Sometimes High Court judgments excite a lot of interest not only from lawyers, but from the general public. Williams v Commonwealth  HCA 23 (‘Williams [No 2]‘) is one such decision.
The immediate response from the Prime Minister was that the government would try to continue its support of chaplaincy in State schools despite the High Court’s decision. In a comment which was later roundly criticised by many, Coalition backbencher Andrew Laming said that an out-of-touch “alliance of Greens, gays and atheists” had mounted a campaign against chaplaincy culminating in the result of the latest case.
Some saw the case as a ‘Trojan Horse’ for a resurgence of States’ Rights activism, whereas others argued that it was a victory for LGBTIQ youth. Some were concerned about what was going to happen with regard to the funding for chaplains which had already been paid over.
The IPA opined that Williams [No 2] was a win for parliamentary democracy because it reiterated that decisions over how public money should be spent should be made by parliament, not the executive, and that the separation of powers was upheld. With respect, this is overstating the result of Williams [No 2]. Williams [No1] decided that the Commonwealth executive had no power to enter into the funding agreements for chaplaincy with Scripture Union Queensland. The High Court did not decide Williams [No 2] on the basis of parliamentary sovereignty, and as Professor Cheryl Saunders notes, the case ‘does not add a great deal of substance to the conclusions about the ambit of the executive power of the Commonwealth reached in Williams [No 1].’ The judgment did not mention separation of powers. It decided the case on the narrower ground of whether there was any particular head of power which supported the funding in the specific instance of chaplains (it was found that there was no head of power which did support it). As Professor Simon Evans explains here, it hinged around whether there was a ‘benefit to students’. Williams [No 2] simply represents a tightening of our understanding of the legislative heads of power.
Other media commentators were interested in what other programs could be affected by the ruling. Indeed, a perusal of the programs which are covered by Schedule 1AA of the Financial Management and Accountability Regulations 1997 (Cth) makes for interesting reading.
By Thomas Bland
In Williams [No 1], the plaintiff leapt over a procedural hurdle — whether he, as a parent of children who attended a school in which a chaplain was employed pursuant to the National School Chaplaincy Program, had standing to challenge the funding arrangements underlying that program. In Williams [No 2] the Commonwealth defendants, faced with Mr Williams’ second challenge to the funding arrangements, failed to surmount a different hurdle when the Court denied them leave to challenge the correctness of the Court’s decision in Williams [No 1].
In this post, I will briefly examine how the Court in Williams [No 2] dealt with the plaintiff’s standing and the Commonwealth’s ill-fated attempt to have Williams [No 1] overruled, and I will make some observations on the Court’s approach to these issues.
One of the questions reserved for the Full Court in Williams [No 2] was whether the plaintiff had standing to bring the challenge to s 32B of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth). The Commonwealth conceded in its written submissions that, ‘in light of the position taken by the [intervening States]’, the plaintiff had standing. The Court accepted this concession and answered the question thus: ‘[I]n the circumstances of this case, and to the extent necessary for the determination of this matter, yes’ (at ). (The Court explained the reasons for the qualified answer, but they are irrelevant for present purposes.)
The Commonwealth’s concession was doubtless informed by the Court’s holding on the plaintiff’s standing in Williams [No 1]. Given that counsel for the Commonwealth (as discussed further below) went on to challenge the substantive holdings in Williams [No 1], it is perhaps unsurprising that they conceded the standing point. If the Court held that the plaintiff lacked standing, the Commonwealth’s opportunity to have Williams [No 1] overruled would not arise. However, the Court’s holding on standing in Williams [No 1] arguably signals a departure from its previous practice. It is worth considering whether this is so, and if so, what this might mean for future litigants. Continue reading
By Professor Cheryl Saunders
Williams [No 2] does not add a great deal of substance to the conclusions about the ambit of the executive power of the Commonwealth reached in Williams [No 1]. The principal question for the Court was the validity of the legislation that had been enacted in the wake of Williams [No 1], to provide a loose statutory base for the National School Chaplaincy and Student Welfare Program (NSCSWP) and more than 400 other executive spending programs. The reasoning of the Court on the issues raised by this question is dealt with elsewhere in the symposium. In brief, the six sitting Justices, in two separate judgements, rejected arguments that either the benefits to students power (s 51(xxiiiA)) or the corporations power (s 51(xx)) provided a head of power for the legislation in relation to the NSCSWP. The Court did not need to determine whether the covering provisions in the Appropriation Acts provided the necessary legislative base for executive spending programs, because similar questions about a head of power arose: . Nor did it need to reach the more novel question of whether the challenged legislation involved a delegation of legislative power that was so excessive or vague that it transgressed the Constitution in some other way: .
The ambit of federal executive power nevertheless was in issue in Williams [No 2], not least because the Commonwealth sought to reopen Williams [No 1] (for this argument, see ). In place of the majority holding in Williams [No 1], the Commonwealth argued for an understanding of s 61 that identified minimal limitations on the ability of the Executive to contract and spend: . Alternatively, if the executive power also was limited by subject matter, the Commonwealth argued that federal power to contract and spend ‘extends to all those matters that are reasonably capable as being seen of national benefit or concern; that is, all those matters that befit the national government of the federation, as discerned from the text and structure of the Constitution’: . Had either argument succeeded, the legislation might have been upheld as an exercise of s 51(xxxix) in combination with s 61 or even ss 81 and 83. Indeed, on the basis of the first argument, at least, there would have been no need for legislation at all. Both, however, were rejected, as arguments that, effectively, had been tried and had failed before (, ). Williams [No 1] was not reopened and the majority holding stands. Continue reading
By Professor Simon Evans
The National School Chaplaincy Program (NSCP) was struck down in Williams [No 2] because, the High Court concluded, the Commonwealth legislation that purported to authorise it was not a law with respect to ‘benefits to students’.
Williams [No 2] does not determine the fate of this legislation more generally or of the myriad other programs it was enacted to validate following Williams [No 1].
Nor does it deal a permanently fatal blow to the NSCP. But it does raise serious issues for Commonwealth laws and schemes that deal with students and education. This post is an initial sketch of some of those issues and the questions that will have to be addressed in coming months. Continue reading
By Graeme Hill, Barrister
The High Court delivered its judgment in Williams [No 2] only 6 weeks after the hearing, much more quickly than is usual in complex constitutional cases. One reason the Court was able to deliver its judgment so quickly was that the Court carefully narrowed the issues to be dealt with. The Court concentrated on whether the particular item in the Financial Management and Accountability Regulations 1997 (Cth) (FMA Regulations) that referred to the school chaplaincy program was supported by a head of Commonwealth legislative power. The Court’s negative answer to that question meant it was unnecessary to deal with the other arguments raised by the plaintiff.
The Court’s reasoning in this respect is orthodox and, I would suggest, appropriate in this case.
Narrowing the issues
Williams [No 2] considered the validity of the Financial Framework Legislation Amendment Act (No 3) 2012 (Cth) (FFLA Act), which was enacted days after, and in response to, the High Court’s judgment in Williams [No 1]. In outline, the FFLA Act amended the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) (FMA Act) and FMA Regulations in an attempt to confer statutory authority on the Commonwealth executive to make payments under existing grants and programs, including the school chaplaincy program. Continue reading
By Michael Crawford
Why would a litigant want to be a fiduciary?
The law reports of all common law jurisdictions are replete with cases in which fiduciaries who have obtained a financial gain furiously deny that the gain constitutes an unauthorised benefit or that it was obtained in circumstances in which their duty to their principal was in conflict with their personal interest. It is somewhat of a novelty, however, to come across a case in which a fiduciary implores a court to find that he has obtained a benefit in breach of his obligations and that the fruit of his wrongdoing should thus be held on constructive trust for the benefit of his principal. Yet Howard v Commission of Taxation  HCA 21 is just such a case. And why, one might ask, would a fiduciary urge upon a court such an apparently perverse submission? The answer, perhaps unsurprisingly, is tax law.
The appellant was one of six people who entered into a fiduciary joint venture, the purpose of which was to exploit the investment potential of an underperforming golf course in Victoria. The plan agreed upon was to purchase the course, find a long-term tenant to operate it and then sell the reversion to a third party for a profit. The profit realised from the sale would then be divided six ways. The benefit of this strategy was that it would yield a more or less immediate profit, referred to as a ‘day one’ profit, for the participants. Continue reading
This past fortnight, the Court heard two constitutional challenges (to NSW’s consorting offence and a Queensland indefinite detention statute) and two potential landmark appeals (on the admissibility of expert evidence and tort liability for defective building), and also published five judgments (including rulings on the validity of the PNG solution, the chaplaincy program and the cap on protection visas). As well, the Court made some quieter rulings, revoking special leave in a technical case about refugee appeals and allowing a criminal appeal about DNA transfer. To cap off its busy fortnight, the Court also took on two new private law appeals from the following decisions of the NSW Court of Appeal: Continue reading
As noted on our case page and in the media, the High Court has ruled that the funding arrangement for the National School Chaplains program is not supported by the Commonwealth’s legislative or executive power and is therefore invalid.
Opinions on High is proud to announce that it will host an online symposium on the Williams [No 2] decision starting next week. Commentators from Melbourne Law School will post their analyses of the Court’s judgments and the implications of the decision. As always, readers will be able to comment and ask follow up questions on each piece. Anonymous comments are permitted provided you supply a valid email address.
The High Court has allowed an appeal against the decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia in R v Fitzgerald and acquitted the applicant of murder. Continue reading
The High Court has decided the special case arising out of and brought by the same applicant in the recent landmark constitutional law decision, Williams v Commonwealth  HCA 23, and has ruled that the SUQ Funding Agreement is not supported by the legislative or executive power of the Commonwealth.
Both the present challenge and Williams [No 1] revolved around the Commonwealth’s power to enter into an agreement to fund the public company Scripture Union Queensland’s (SUQ) delivery of chaplaincy services to the Darling Heights State Primary School (attended by Mr William’s children). In Williams [No 1], a majority of the Court held that the executive power of the Commonwealth could not support its entry into the agreement with SUQ in order to fund the chaplaincy program because the executive does not have a broad power to enter into contracts or spend public money without the support of legislation (absent another recognised source of power).
This challenge related to the new funding arrangement with SUQ for the renewed and renamed chaplaincy program, funded by a new series of appropriations acts (which also purportedly support the Commonwealth’s entry into the arrangement). Following the decision in Williams No 1, the Commonwealth Parliament inserted s 32B into the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth), which (in conjunction with associated regulations) purports to grant the Commonwealth a general power to make, vary or administer arrangements and grants, where those arrangements or grants are specified in regulations.
The stated case raised eight questions to be answered by the Full Court. The central issues are whether the Commonwealth’s entry into the SUQ funding agreement is authorised by various appropriation acts, and if not, whether s 32B (and its associated regulations) is wholly invalid as going beyond the ambit of the Commonwealth’s executive power, and if not, whether those provisions are supported by a head of legislative power in the Australian Constitution (specifically, ss 51(xxiiiA), 51(xx) or 51(xxxix), operating in conjunction with s 61).
The Court held that the scheme was not supported by s 51(xxiiiA) because the provision of chaplaincy services is not a ‘benefit’ within the meaning of s 51(xxiiiA) in the sense of material aid (as interpreted by the Court in British Medical Association v Commonwealth  HCA 44 or Alexandra Private Geriatric Hospital Pty Ltd v Commonwealth  HCA 6) directly made to students. Payments to be applied as wages to chaplains who are to ‘support the wellbeing’ of students are not ‘benefits’ to students within the meaning of s 51(xxiiiA): at . Nor was it supported by s 51(xx) as the scheme does not regulate or permit any act by or on behalf of a corporation: ‘[t]he corporation’s capacity to make the agreement and receive and apply the payments is not provided by the impugned provisions’ (at ). The Court also declined to reopen Williams [No 1] on the basis that the Commonwealth’s submissions here were ‘no more than a repetition of the “broad basis” submissions’ on executive power rejected by the majority in Williams [No 1], and noting that the Commonwealth’s arguments rested on a ‘false assumption’ about the ambit of federal executive power (see at –). Finally, the Court rejected the s 51(xxxix) argument as being contrary to Pape v Commissioner of Taxation  HCA 23 and Williams [No 1]: appropriations do not necessarily bring the expenditures within the power of the Commonwealth. Crennan J agreed with the majority but made a reservation regarding s 51(xxiiiA) noting that it was unnecessary for the Court to come to any conclusions on the wisdom of the scheme (at ); instead it was only necessary to find that the scheme did not provide government assistance to or for students as prescribed and identifiable beneficiaries: , .
The Full Court has decided the special case in Plaintiff S156/2013 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, and has upheld the validity of the challenged legislation and the Minister’s designation of Papua New Guinea as a regional processing country. Continue reading
By Anna Dziedzic
In the past year, the High Court has handed down three decisions dealing with the relationship between the compulsory examination powers given to various Australian crime commissions and the principles of a fair criminal trial.
In X7 v Australian Crime Commission  HCA 29, a majority of the Court held that the compulsory examination powers given to the Australian Crime Commission did not permit the ACC to examine a person charged with an offence about matters relating to the criminal charges that he or she was facing. A compulsory examination in these circumstances would fundamentally depart from the accusatorial nature of Australia’s criminal justice system. The judges in the majority refused to interpret the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) as working such a fundamental change to common law principles.
In Lee v NSW Crime Commission  HCA 39 (Lee #1) the High Court considered the same issue but in relation to different legislation. In Lee #1 a majority of the Court held that the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW) did permit a compulsory examination on matters relating to pending criminal charges. In this case, the majority considered that the words of the statute clearly disclosed an intention to abrogate the right to silence while providing adequate safeguards to ensure that any future criminal trial was conducted fairly.
The third and most recent case on this issue was decided last month. Lee v The Queen  HCA 20 (Lee #2) saw the appellants in Lee #1 return to the High Court to appeal their convictions for drug and firearms offences. In a unanimous judgment, the High Court held that the appellants had not received a fair trial because confidential transcripts of their compulsory examinations before the NSW Crime Commission had been given to the Director of Public Prosecutions to assist it to prepare the prosecution’s case. The High Court held that this was a fundamental departure from the requirements of the accusatorial trial and resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
The decision in Lee #2 has been welcomed as a victory for the right to silence. In this post, I suggest that while Lee #2 does uphold the common law principles which guide the role of the prosecution in criminal trials, the case does not fully resolve the questions that arise from the close relationship between the state authorities that investigate crime and those that prosecute it. Continue reading
The High Court has unanimously dismissed an appeal against the decision of the Full Federal Court in Howard v Commissioner of Taxation, which involved three appeals to the Federal Court relating to the appellant’s 2005 and 2006 taxable income. Continue reading
On behalf of the Opinions on High team I offer our condolences and sympathy to Leslie’s family and share the sadness experienced by all those who got to know Leslie during his life. Leslie’s life was marked by achievement, dedication and generosity. Geoffrey Lindell offered a glimpse of these markers in his 2010 Federal Law Review reflection on his relationship with Leslie.
Leslie’s scholarship focussed on relationships within the federal domain and his personality and personability meant that he readily built relationships within the ANU College of Law, where he dedicated much of his working life. It was there where I met Leslie and shared a law school corridor for five years. This was a time when he was nearing the end of his career at the university and I was starting mine. His reputation as a highly esteemed scholar and intellect, something I had gleaned from his involvement in and writing about the Tasmanian Dam case (which I continue to use in my teaching), preceded him. Despite this, Leslie was accessible, friendly and generous with his wisdom and laughter. That is how I will remember him.
By Dr Dale Smith
A man allegedly makes a 17-year-old perform a sexual act on him in the presence of her 16-year-old sister. He is prosecuted on the basis that neither sister consented. One argument that the prosecution puts to the jury is that any consent was negated by the man’s abuse of a position of authority or trust — he was a family friend and had known both girls since they were young.
In Gillard v The Queen  HCA 16, the High Court considered what the prosecution had to prove about the mind of this man in order to convict him of crimes akin to rape. Did he have to know that he was abusing his authority or trust? Or was recklessness about that enough (and, if so, about what)? The High Court’s unanimous answer casts new light on how the Court interprets modern statutes that define sexual offences such as rape.
The alleged abuse of authority
From 1993 until 2000, two sisters spent part of the summer school holidays staying with Michael Gillard at his Canberra home. Gillard knew both sisters, born in the early 1980s, from a young age. He had met their father while serving in the Army and the two men had become friends. It was subsequently alleged that Gillard had committed a number of sexual offences against both girls while they were staying with him in Canberra. Some of the offences were alleged to have been committed against the oldest before she turned 16, while others were alleged to have been committed after both turned 16. At his trial, he was convicted of some, but not all, of the offences that were alleged to have taken place before the older sister turned 16.
At issue in the High Court was his further convictions for four offences alleged to have occurred after both sisters had turned 16, including the incident described above. Continue reading
We have recently passed the 20 year anniversary of the High Court’s decision in Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd  HCA 13 (24 March 1994). However, the judgment is still subject to debate. Our current exploitation of land for natural resources has encouraged further consideration of this High Court decision. Continue reading
By Dr Lael Weis
Should the state be able to seize ‘all or any’ property ‘owned or controlled by’ persons convicted of multiple drug-related offences, regardless of the connection of that property to the commission of crime?
In a recently decided case, Attorney General (NT) v Emmerson  HCA 13, the High Court upheld Northern Territory criminal forfeiture legislation that authorises exactly that. In upholding the legislation, the Court held that the constitutional requirement that laws for the acquisition of property must be on ‘just terms’ is categorically inapplicable to criminal forfeiture, no matter how harsh, on the basis that it falls within a historically well-established exemption for punitive laws.
Reginald Emmerson’s crimes and possessions
In February 2011 Reginald William Emmerson was charged with two offences: the supply of 18.6646 kilograms of cannabis (with an estimated commercial value between $184,500 and $918,400, depending on the quantity in which it was sold), and the possession of $70,500 obtained from the commission of drug related-offences in the Northern Territory. In conjunction with prior convictions for possession and use (but notably not the supply or sale) of drugs, this made him eligible to have all of his property restrained in anticipation of him becoming eligible to be declared a ‘drug trafficker’ under s 36A of the Misuse of Drugs Act (NT) if he was convicted. The Director of Public Prosecutions applied to restrain his property and, after his conviction for the February 2011 charges, to have the Northern Territory Supreme Court make such a declaration. The sole and direct legal consequence of that declaration was forfeiture of Mr Emmerson’s restrained property to the Territory, pursuant to s 94(1) of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act (NT). That particular section of the Forfeiture Act provides for the forfeiture of ‘all property … that is owned or effectively controlled by the person’ and ‘all property that was given away by the person, whether before or after the commencement of this Act’ for any person declared a ‘drug trafficker’ under s 36A of the Misuse of Drugs Act.
When Mr Emmerson was ultimately convicted of the February 2011 charges in September of that year, he forfeited property valued in excess of $850,000 to the Northern Territory, including: his home, 12 vehicles (including a ute, a boat and trailer and motorcycles) and bank accounts. All parties accepted that, apart from the $70,050 seized from Mr Emmerson’s most recent offence, the forfeited property had been acquired through legitimate means and had no connection to any criminal offence.
Mr Emmerson challenged the forfeiture on two bases: (1) on the basis that the relevant statutory provisions violated the separation of judicial power under ch III of the Commonwealth Constitution, and (2) on the basis that it effected an acquisition of property that was otherwise than on ‘just terms’ in contravention of S 50(1) of the Northern Territory Self-Government Act 1978 (Cth).
Both challenges were rejected by a 6:1 majority of the High Court (with Gageler J not deciding the ch III issue, and dissenting on the property issue).
With apologies to any Kable fans out there, this entry focuses exclusively on the acquisition of property issue. What follows is a fairly lengthy — and, OK yes, at times indulgent — discussion of some of the ins and outs and twists and turns of constitutional property jurisprudence issues implicated by the Court’s strict adherence to this categorical exemption for forfeiture laws in the Emmerson case.
Those of you who are not particularly interested in going on such a ride are probably better jumping off here, and checking out the judgment summary.
By Dr Katy Barnett
Napoleon Bonaparte said ‘the best way to keep one’s word is not to give it’. Perhaps the defendant in Sidhu v Van Dyke  HCA 19 should have heeded those words, although the case came down not to the fact that Sidhu made and broke a promise, but to the fact that that the plaintiff, Van Dyke, relied upon the promise to her detriment (see the joint judgment at ).
Van Dyke had rented a cottage from Sidhu and his wife, who lived 100 metres away in the main homestead on the property. The property was jointly owned by Sidhu and his wife. Van Dyke and Sidhu commenced a sexual relationship which led to the breakdown of Van Dyke’s marriage. Sidhu told Van Dyke not to worry about getting a property settlement in the divorce, as he would subdivide the land belonging to him and his wife, and give the cottage to Van Dyke. However, when his relationship with Van Dyke ended some eight years later, Sidhu repudiated his earlier promises and Sidhu’s wife refused to consent to a subdivision. The High Court clarified that Australian law did not recognise Lord Denning’s ‘presumption of reliance’ in Greasley v Cooke  1 WLR 1306. In other words, Australian law does not presume reliance on the part of a representee (in this instance Van Dyke), and a representee is still required to make out detrimental reliance. Moreover, the burden of proof to establish detrimental reliance is always on the representee.
The Court unanimously concluded that Van Dyke had made out detrimental reliance and found that Sidhu was estopped from denying his promise to Van Dyke. But as the cottage had burned down and the subdivision had never taken place, Van Dyke was awarded equitable compensation reflecting the value of what she had lost. Continue reading
The High Court has unanimously allowed two appeals against the decision of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in Lee v The Queen. Continue reading
By Professor Graham Virgo
Downing College, University of Cambridge
The central premise of C J Sansom’s excellent novel Dominion, is that Britain surrendered to Germany in 1940 and became a satellite state of the Third Reich. Sansom describes a very different world as a consequence of this surrender, but one populated by real people whose lives were put on a very different course by that single momentous event. Such counter-factual, ‘what if?’, history is fascinating. The same game can be played with the law of restitution. What if England had not recognised the law of unjust enrichment, developed from Lord Mansfield’s judgment in Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr 1005, 97 ER 676 via the misconceived implied contract theory, and retained the equitable principles which originally underpinned restitutionary claims? But that question can be answered without resort to fictional speculation. The answer is to be found in Australia. The most recent decision of the High Court of Australia in Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty Ltd v Hills Industries Ltd  HCA 14 reveals the nature of this counter-factual (from an English perspective) anti-unjust enrichment, pro-Equity world (see also Elise Bant’s post here). But when that world is investigated rather more rigorously this law of restitution is, to mix the literary allusions, nothing more than Hans Christian Andersen’s Emperor, albeit one who thinks he is wearing old clothes, but he is actually wearing nothing at all. Continue reading
The High Court today granted special leave to appeal in seven cases as follows: Continue reading
The High Court has unanimously dismissed an appeal against the decision of the NSWCA in Van Dyke v Sidhu. Continue reading
By Professor Adrienne Stone
In 1992, in Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth  HCA 1, the very first case on the constitutional freedom of political communication, the High Court struck down a Commonwealth law prohibiting electronic advertising during election periods. That law had been enacted as a campaign finance reform measure aimed at reducing the reliance of political parties on their donors and thus the High Court’s first application of the freedom of political communication struck a blow to the cause of campaign finance reform in Australia.
In more than twenty years since, however, freedom of political communication cases have focused on other questions such as the protection of political process, the application of defamation law in political debate and the permissibility of insult laws. It was not until late last year, however, that the Court returned to consider the operation of the freedom of political communication to the regulation of electoral finance. In Unions NSW v New South Wales  HCA 58, the Court heard a challenge brought by unions to two sections of the Election Funding, Expenditure and Disclosures Act 1981 (NSW).
What were the challenged laws?
The general scheme of this Act requires disclosure of political donations by political parties, members of parliament, candidates and ‘third party campaigners’ (other persons who incur more than $2000 in electoral expenditure annually). It also caps the amount that can be donated to these persons and the total amount of electoral communication expenditure for State election campaigns. Continue reading
The High Court has unanimously allowed an appeal against the ACT Court of Appeal’s decision to dismiss an appeal against multiple convictions for child sexual offences and rape by a family friend of the complainants. The Court quashed each of the four convictions and a new trial has been ordered for those counts. Continue reading
By Professor Elise Bant
What is the change of position defence and why is it important?
The change of position defence provides nuanced protection to good faith defendants who irreversibly change their position in reliance on receipt of an impugned benefit (such as a mistaken payment) from a plaintiff. Since its recognition a little over two decades ago by the High Court of Australia in David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia  HCA 48, the change of position defence has assumed a position of great importance within the Australian law of unjust enrichment. Its recognition has enabled courts to take a more principled approach to the operation of unjust factors such as mistake, obviating the need for fine and ultimately insupportable distinctions between different types of mistake that traditionally operated to restrict defendants’ restitutionary liability at the expense of legitimate claims by plaintiffs. Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty Ltd v Hills Industries Ltd  HCA 14 provides a stark illustration of why a change of position defence may be important, as the respondents received mistaken payments from the appellant as a result of the involvement of a third party fraudster. In reliance on those payments, they changed their position in various important ways. Unless they were successful in their pleaded defence, they would be placed in a worse position than they occupied prior to their receipt. In finding in favour of the respondents, the High Court has considered the rationale of the defence, whether it applies to non-reliance based changes of position, whether changes of position must always be valued in terms of specific monetary sums and the interplay between change of position and other defences such estoppel and the agent’s defence of payment over.
How did change of position become relevant in this case?
AFSL (a financier) was induced by a fraudster (S) to make payments to a number of businesses, including Hills and Bosch, for the purchase of non-existent equipment. S advised Hills and Bosch that the payments were for the discharge of debts owed to them by his companies (the ‘company debts’). In reliance on their receipts, Hills and Bosch treated the company debts as discharged, continued to trade with the companies and gave up the opportunity to pursue remedies in enforcement proceedings against the companies or their directors. Both recipients also gave up the opportunity of taking other steps to better their position, such as by seeking security from third parties. Continue reading
The High Court today heard its fourth day of oral arguments in Ron Williams’s current challenge to the National School Chaplaincy Program. The High Court’s willingness to allow days of argument on major cases sharply contrasts with the United States Supreme Court, which abandoned the practice of lengthy arguments in 1849, and now typically allows just 30 minutes per side and often hears two full cases in a morning. The more relaxed approach in Australia allows arguments to develop and even alter substantially during the course of a hearing. However, that flexibility was itself a matter of controversy in Williams’s previous challenge to the Chaplaincy Program in 2011. Continue reading
The High Court has unanimously dismissed an appeal against the decision of the NSW Court of Appeal in a case concerning (among other things) the scope of so-called ‘defences’ to restitutionary claims, specifically the change of position defence. Continue reading
A five-member bench of the High Court has unanimously allowed an appeal against the decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal in Atco Controls Pty Ltd (in liq) v Stewart. Continue reading
The High Court played a role on both occasions when jury findings against Raymond Carroll in relation to the death of toddler Deidre Kennedy were overturned on appeal. In 1985, Carroll’s conviction for Kennedy’s murder was quashed by Queensland’s Court of Criminal Appeal, relying in part on the High Court’s judgments in Chamberlain (to hold that the jury should have been directed that it should not rely on forensic evidence that his teeth matched a bite on the toddler’s body unless satisfied of that fact beyond reasonable doubt) and Markby, Perry and Sutton (to hold that ‘similar fact’ evidence of Carroll’s alleged biting of another child was inadmissible). Each of these High Court judgments have since been qualified by later High Court judgments (Edwards and Pfenning) and (in some states) legislation. More importantly, in 2002, the High Court ruled that Carroll’s subsequent conviction for perjury (for allegedly lying at the 1985 trial when he denied murdering the toddler) was an abuse of process because of the rule against double jeopardy. Following England’s lead, most Australian states and territories have since enacted exceptions to the rule against double jeopardy.
By Brad Jessup
On 12 December 2013 the High Court revealed its decision in Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory  HCA 55 (Same Sex Marriage case) on the Commonwealth’s challenge to the Marriage Equality (Same Sex) Act 2013 (ACT), and at the same time it reduced the possibilities for other state and territory proposals for so-called ‘marriage equality laws’.
This blog post presents an alternative way of understanding the case and judgment in the Same Sex Marriage case. I use my interests in the case, my background exposure to the jurisprudence of same sex marriage, and my experiences following the decisions of the High Court of Australia throughout 2013 as an editor of the Opinions on High blog to support my autoethnographic analysis.
I will try to articulate why, despite being reluctant to engage with the issue of same sex marriage for so long, I was surprised and hurt when I learnt of the decision of the High Court.
From Canberra to California
Soon after I began my academic career in Canberra one of my new colleagues entered into Australia’s first public same sex civil partnership. Other new Canberra friends registered their relationship in accordance with the Civil Partnerships Act 2008 (ACT) over the counter while paying their vehicle registration. My boyfriend and I had been ACT residents for about six months and together for over two years. So we could have done the same. We didn’t. We didn’t even discuss it.
My scholarly interests remained elsewhere. Others had been productive, provocative and persuasive in the space. This was so especially following the passage of the Marriage Amendment Act 2004 (Cth), which asserted the federal Parliament’s intent that marriage be a union of a woman and a man. Moreover, I had ‘troubles’ with marriage; let alone ‘gay marriage’, as an exclusionary, archaic institution. Nevertheless, I was not entirely agnostic. I had responded to queries from curious friends about the requirement of celebrants to pronounce the meaning of marriage at their weddings. I also became intrigued by the constitutional, and more so the geographical and sociological, battles over same sex marriage within the States of the US. Continue reading
A majority of the High Court has allowed an appeal against the decision of the Northern Territory Court of Appeal in Attorney-General (NT) v Emmerson. Continue reading
In 1996, the High Court – in arguably its most significant constitutional law decision in recent decades – struck down a NSW law providing for the continued detention of one person, Gregory Wayne Kable, ruling that a number of aspects of that law, including its one-person nature, were incompatible with the institutional integrity of state Supreme Courts required by the federal constitution. Last year, the Court revisited that case, ruling out Kable’s claim that he was falsely imprisoned under the invalid law. It seems likely that the High Court will revisit that decision in another way this year. The Victorian Parliament today enacted a Bill barring parole except in cases of permanent physical incapacity or imminent death for just one person – the ‘prisoner Julian Knight’.
A recent article in Slate reported that female lawyers who dress too “sexily” are said to be a “huge problem” in US courtroom. Some courts have instituted “dress codes” and some universities have instructed their students on what appropriate dress should be. The dress codes and instructions have included instructions for men, but have concentrated on female clothing. When I posted this on Facebook it started off a discussion. A number of male lawyer friends made the point that men were subject to dress codes too, and that men who didn’t wear ties or who wore short sleeves would be likely to contravene the dress code. This is true. However, I think that women have to navigate a vastly more complex situation. Continue reading
A majority of Canada’s Supreme Court today ruled that:
the appointment of Justice Nadon and his swearing-in as a judge of the Court were void ab initio. He remains a supernumerary judge of the Federal Court of Appeal.
‘[T]he Court’ the Court referred to, was, of course, the very Court that made that ruling. If the dissent of Moldaver J had prevailed, Nadon J would now be (and would have been for months) a fellow member of the Court that just ruled him ineligible for membership. The background to the decision is described here. Continue reading
The High Court today held special leave hearings today for sixteen matters from the ACT, NSW, South Australia, Western Australia and the Federal Court. Of these, six cases were granted special leave to appeal. The six cases are: Continue reading
By Wayne Jocic and Matthew Bell
Every transactional lawyer, and his or her clients, can imagine the situation. Contract negotiations have stalled because one party is unable to commit unconditionally to an obligation: aspects of its performance, it says, are beyond its control. That party might be a builder who is reluctant to provide a warranty that a third party assessor will accredit a building’s environmental sustainability to a particular standard, or an information technology contractor which needs to provide documents to independent consultants but cannot guarantee that they will keep them confidential.
The contract needs to be finalised and signed. Where do the parties turn?
Inevitably, the drafter or negotiator will call for help from an ‘endeavours’ clause. Whether the adjective in which it is clothed is ‘best’, ‘reasonable’ or otherwise, the concept often ends up being the foundation on which the conditioned obligation rests. Prudent drafters typically seek to add precision, perhaps by specifying criteria by which the endeavours are to be tested, or by setting out specific action that the counterparty must take.
In Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd  HCA 7 (Verve Energy), the High Court was called upon to decide whether a clause requiring gas sellers to use ‘reasonable endeavours’ to supply a ‘supplemental’ amount of gas was breached by the sellers. They had declined to make that gas available, largely because they could charge more than the contracted amount for it. Continue reading
Last year, some Australians learnt the outcome of the High Court’s same-sex marriage decision minutes (or more) before it was delivered. This weekend, the result of a UK Supreme Court decision was announced in the UK press four days before it was delivered. The case concerned an investigation of an alleged leak from a government emergency committee to a Sky News reporter. Scotland Yard’s Chief Commissioner asked the Supreme Court to overturn a lower court’s ruling that a court cannot rely on secret (undisclosed) government evidence to order a media organisation to disclose documents relevant to the investigation. However, according to one paper:
The Mail on Sunday understands that the Supreme Court has rejected his demand. Its ruling is due to be published on Wednesday.
As yesterday’s Supreme Court judgment revealed, the Mail’s reporting was accurate.
So, who leaked the Court’s media leak judgment to the media? Continue reading
By Professor Elise Bant
Some may regard the recent High Court of Australian decision in Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Limited  HCA 7 (Verve Energy) as a missed opportunity to clarify the doctrine of duress. The basic elements of duress are straightforward: the plaintiff must have been (1) subjected to illegitimate pressure which (2) caused the plaintiff to confer a benefit on the defendant (see Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 19 NSWLR 40, 45–6 (McHugh JA)). However, the boundaries of the doctrine are highly controversial. Verve Energy seemed to provide the opportunity to examine some of these controversies, in particular the operation and boundaries of so-called ‘economic duress’ and whether ‘lawful act duress’ is anything other than a legal oxymoron.
Why did the High Court not consider duress?
As it was, Verve Energy was decided on contractual principles. Specifically, a majority of the High Court held that the respondent Woodside had not breached any contractual duties to Verve in the light of the Court’s interpretation of key contractual provisions. It was conceded by the parties that this rendered consideration of the duress case unnecessary (at ). This narrow approach to deciding the case, however, leaves the door open for the Court to consider the duress issues afresh, and on the basis of full and proper argument, in due course. In the meantime, the Court of Appeal decision insofar as it relates to duress remains a valuable addition to the body of authority on this important area. Furthermore, certain characterisations of duress made in argument before the High Court that, if accepted, would have substantially altered the nature of duress in Australia, and for the worse, have for the time being been shelved. This again leaves it open to the High Court on another occasion, and in the light of full argument on the points, to reinforce the core nature and operation of duress in Australia. Continue reading
By Dr Katy Barnett
Clark v Macourt  HCA 56 is a case where the damages awarded far outstripped the cost of the original contract. The contract concerned the sale of an IVF business for close to $387,000, but a majority of the High Court affirmed the decision of the trial judge that the purchaser of the business was entitled to damages of over $1.2 million for a breach of warranty, as a substantial amount of the sperm included as an asset of the business did not comply with the warranty. This award was made notwithstanding the fact that the purchaser passed the cost of purchasing substitute sperm onto patients. This post will concentrate on the High Court’s recognition of the plaintiff’s interest in performance of the contract and the way in which damages are measured. Continue reading
In February, I noted that Gordon J had handed down her decision in Paciocco v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Limited  FCA 52, the bank fees case. The ABC reports that the bank customers lodged an appeal yesterday. The Bank is still considering its position, and has three weeks to make a decision, but I would not be surprised if it also appealed. Nor would I be surprised if this case ends up before the High Court again.
Update: it’s always nice to have one’s predictions confirmed. As pointed out in comments below, the Sydney Morning Herald reports that the Bank filed an appeal today.
By Professor Jeremy Gans
Some trace the term ‘money laundering’ to the coin-operated Chinese laundromats that Al Capone pretended were the source of millions he earned from Prohibition-era alcohol sales and vice. This dubious origin-story rests on some hard facts: that crime can pay, that it may pay a lot, but that not all money is equal. If criminals want to spend their profits without attracting attention to their crimes, they have to find a way to make it look like their riches were legitimately earned. That is, illicit money is of little value until it is ‘cleaned’.
The criminal law now adds to the wealthy criminal’s burden by deeming the act of money laundering to be an especially heinous offence in and of itself. In Australia, after police and prosecutors baulked at the dirty work of sorting out criminals’ financial shenanigans, legislatures and courts have recently stretched the offence’s definition to include simply handling any money or property en route to or from any crime. The result is that many very ordinary criminal acts can now also be charged as money laundering. Shoplifting. Bank robbery. Social security fraud. Commercial offences. Just about any crime that involves anything of value. That includes tax evasion, the only crime the Americans were able to pin on Al Capone. Or it did, until the High Court put a stop to the bloat of money laundering last month.
Airing some dirty laundry
On Valentine’s Day 2004, officers of the Australian Crime Commission entered a presidential suite in Melbourne’s Sheraton Towers (now The Langham), armed with a warrant to search for evidence that celebrity lawyer Michael Brereton had schemed to evade tax. Brereton himself was never charged with tax fraud, but the Toshiba notebook computer they seized (belonging to the room’s occupant, Philip Egglishaw) yielded a list of the clients of Egglishaw’s Geneva firm Strachan and prompted seven federal agencies to join forces to investigate offshore tax havens.
Project Wickenby has resulted in dozens of prosecutions and convictions and has featured at least yearly in the High Court’s caseload this decade. In 2010, the Court rejected attempts by one of Wickenby’s most famous (but also never charged) targets, Paul Hogan, to keep a document detailing his tax affairs secret. The next year, the Court ruled that the common law did not prevent the Commission from compulsorily examining one target’s wife. In 2010, 2011 and 2013, the Court dismissed three criminal appeals by convicted Wickenby targets. This run of successes in the High Court ended with this year’s Milne v The Queen  HCA 4. Continue reading
While Russia was busy reminding the world of, among other things, the perennial problems of compliance and enforcement of international law (see the coverage on Opinio Juris here and here), the judges of the International Court of Justice delivered a sharp series of orders against Australia in its ongoing dispute with Timor-Leste before the ICJ. On the bench as Australia’s nominated judge ad hoc — but voting against all three declarations — was former High Court Justice Ian Callinan AC.
On 3 December 2013, ASIO intelligence officers seized documents, data and property located at the ACT offices of Bernard Collaery, a lawyer advising Timor-Leste in its ongoing dispute with Australia at the Permanent Court of Arbitration over a $40 billion oil and gas treaty. Timor-Leste requested that the ICJ make ‘indications of provisional measures’ — roughly equivalent to interlocutory orders in domestic courts. Continue reading
Last Friday saw a dubious first: video of argument before the United States Supreme Court, now available on youtube. The matter was McCutcheon v Federal Electoral Commission, argued last October, on the vexed issue of campaign finance laws. There are several reasons this ‘first’ is dubious. For starters, there are two past clandestine photos of the court at work, albeit taken over eighty years ago. As well,the youtube video barely shows anything, as it was also taken surreptitiously and focused mainly on a protest by a group opposed to the Court’s controversial Citizens United ruling striking down limits on corporate donations. (Australia’s High Court heard and ruled on a similar case late last year.) While the video has drawn modest attention to issue of campaign financing, its main impact has been to prompt some interesting discussion of the legality of videos and protests inside a national court.
Economists from Monash University, Dr Vinod Mishra and Professor Russell Smyth, have published a paper in the Australian Journal of Political Science examining the effect of barrister gender on appeal outcomes in the High Court of Australia. According to the abstract:
We examine the relationship between gender of the barrister and appeal outcomes on the High Court of Australia. We find that an appellant represented in oral argument by a female barrister, opposed to a respondent represented in oral argument by a male barrister, is less likely to receive a High Court justice’s vote. However, we also find that the appellant disadvantage of having a female barrister present oral argument is (partially) offset in the case of liberal justices and on panels having a higher proportion of female justices. The extent to which the disadvantage is offset, and potentially turns from being a disadvantage to an advantage, depends on the degree to which the justice is liberal and the proportion of female justices on the panel.
The Hon Michael Kirby’s High Court career (from 1996 to 2009) has been bookended by inquiries undertaken for the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights into human rights initiatives and abuses of foreign states: milestones that underscore his commitment to and involvement in United Nations bodies particularly related to AIDS and human rights. In 1996 he reported for the final time on recommendations for a human rights based governance model for Cambodia, then emerging from years of conflict and human rights abuse. His focus then was to ensure that a new government created a political and legal regime that protected internationally recognised human rights. This week a report authored by former Justice Kirby was released that detailed the current and historic widespread human rights abuses committed by the government of North Korea against its own people. Kirby concluded that the abuses and crimes against humanity were perpetrated by the government, institutions and policies of the state. Continue reading
Further to my brief post two weeks ago linking to Grahame Orr’s piece on the WA Senate Election case on The Conversation, Professor Anne Twomey of the University of Sydney has posted ‘Missing Votes Means It’s Back to the Polls for Western Australia’ late yesterday on The Conversation. There is also a longer version of this post available on Sydney’s Constitutional Critique blog that goes into more detail about the facts of the case, the workings of the Court of Disputed Returns, and the decision itself. While several high profile electoral law cases have ended up before the High Court in recent years (Unions NSW v New South Wales  HCA 58; Rowe v Electoral Commissioner  HCA 46; Roach v Electoral Commissioner  HCA 43; Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission  HCA 41), these have concerned constitutional issues around voting rights (Roach and Rowe) the registration of political parties (Mulholland) or electoral funding (Unions NSW), rather than the contestation of electoral results themselves before the Court of Disputed Returns. Given the rarity of its operation, it is all the more helpful to have timely expert commentary on the workings of the Court of Disputed Returns.
Twomey notes an issue that many readers will have considered: can Hayne J’s decision be appealed to the Full Court? Continue reading
At Friday’s special leave hearings, the High Court only granted leave to appeal in one case decided by the NSW Court of Appeal, a corporations law matter. However, the Court also ruled that it will hear and decide another case that is before the NSW Court of Appeal but which that court is yet to rule upon. The case is an ongoing prosecution of three people for committing the NSW crime of consorting. Even though there hasn’t been a trial so far, the matter was before the NSW Court of Appeal to determine whether or not the provision setting out the offence is invalid. Friday’s ruling means that the High Court will now be the first and final court to rule on that question.
What is the challenge about? Continue reading
By Megan Driscoll and Houston Ash
Dozens of people who have been found to be genuine refugees remain in immigration detention in Australia because they are the subjects of secret adverse security assessments made by the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). Plaintiff M76/2013 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship  HCA 53 was a case brought by one of these refugees, challenging her continued detention under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). It was of particular interest to High Court watchers because the plaintiff sought to challenge the correctness of the controversial 2004 High Court decision of Al-Kateb v Godwin  HCA 37. In that case, a majority of the High Court held that the Migration Act could authorise the indefinite detention of ‘unlawful non-citizens’. In the event, a majority of the High Court in Plaintiff M76 chose not to consider the correctness of Al-Kateb. However, Plainitff M76 nonetheless sheds some light on the prospect of Al-Kateb being overturned in the future. It also ties together two recent decisions of the High Court relating to Australia’s asylum seeker assessment procedures.
Plaintiff M76’s entry into Australia
The plaintiff in this case is a Sri Lankan Tamil woman, known to us as Plaintiff M76, who entered Australia by boat at Christmas Island in May 2010 seeking asylum. Under the Migration Act, she was classified as an ‘unlawful non-citizen’ and, having arrived in Australia at an ‘excised offshore place’, she was also an ‘offshore entry person’ (now ‘unauthorised maritime arrival’). Section 189(3) of the Migration Act required officers of the Department of Immigration to immediately detain her, and under s 196(1) she must remain in immigration detention until she is removed from Australia, deported, granted a visa, or she is dealt with for the purpose of removing her to a regional processing country. Section 198(2) of the Migration Act requires officers to remove Plaintiff M76 from Australia as soon as reasonably practicable provided that she either has not made a valid application for a substantive visa or her visa application has been finally determined. Continue reading
In a joint press release, the Prime Minister, Employment Minister and Attorney-General today made their expected announcement of a new royal commission into trade union governance and corruption. The announcement revealed the new commissioner:
The Government will also recommend that The Honourable John Dyson Heydon AC QC be appointed as Commissioner to lead this inquiry. A former High Court Judge, His Honour has a distinguished legal career and I am pleased to confirm his willingness to accept this appointment.
Dyson Heydon is the most recent judge to leave the High Court, reaching the constitutionally mandated retirement age of 70 on 1 March last year.
In some respects, the role will be a familiar one for Mr Heydon. Continue reading
I noted in December last year that the issue of bank fees was back before Gordon J in the Federal Court. Today, Gordon J has handed down her decision in Paciocco v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Limited  FCA 52. Her original decision on the matter, Andrews v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group  FCA 1376, was appealed to to the High Court in Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited  HCA 30. The case was remitted back to Gordon J. Somewhat confusingly, Paciocco is another representative plaintiff but the action is still the same. Interestingly, the outcome of Paciocco is very similar to the trial decision in Andrews. In the trial decision in Andrews, Gordon J held that only late payment fees were illegal penalties, whereas honour fees, dishonour fees, overlimit fees and non-payment fees were not illegal penalties. Despite the High Court’s extension of the doctrine of penalties in 2012, the outcome of Paciocco was identical: only late payment fees were penalties. This must be a relief to the bank and to other commercial entities, but a disappointment to the consumers. Continue reading
By Anna Dziedzic
In Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission  HCA 39, the High Court split 4:3 on the application of the ‘principle of legality’ — a rule of statutory interpretation which requires parliament to use clear statutory language if it intends to restrict fundamental rights or depart from general principles of law. This post attempts to trace whether the differences between the members of the Court reflect merely a different interpretation of the NSW crime legislation in question, or lie at the deeper level of the rationale and operation of the principle of legality.
NSW’s criminal assets recovery legislation
Father and son Jason Lee and Seong Won Lee were arrested for money laundering, drugs and firearms offences. After they were charged — but before the completion of their trial — the NSW Crime Commission applied to the NSW Supreme Court for various orders under the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW).
This Act sets out a scheme for the confiscation of property if the Supreme Court finds it ‘more probable than not’ that a person has engaged in serious crime related activity (s 3(a)). There is no requirement for the person to have been convicted of a criminal offence.
Section 31D authorises the Crime Commission to seek orders for the examination of a person about the person’s affairs or those of another. Such examinations are to be held before the Supreme Court. During an examination, the person must provide information even if it tends to incriminate him or her, but such information is not admissible in criminal proceedings (s 31A). In other words, the legislation abrogates the privilege against self-incrimination but provides ‘direct use’ immunity.
The Crime Commission applied for an order that Jason Lee and Seong Won Lee be examined on oath before the Court. The Judge hearing the application refused to make the order on the grounds that it would expose the Lees to questioning about matters relevant to the criminal charges they were facing, creating a real risk of interference in their ongoing criminal trials. The NSW Court of Appeal overturned this decision. Jason and Seong Won Lee then appealed to the High Court. Continue reading
Professor Graeme Orr at the University of Queensland recently published ‘In Whose Interest? The High Court and the WA Senate Vote’ on The Conversation, covering Australian Electoral Commission v Johnston. Orr’s piece is an incisive and clear explanation of what is a fairly convoluted case, and is very much worth a read. Orr also notes that a decision from Justice Hayne is expected to be handed down today, with two likely results: either Justice Hayne will declare the election void, or the case will continue, ‘with further legal argument and the parties scrapping over disputed ballots in the coming weeks or months’. As of posting, no media organisations have reported on the decision, but we’ll post links to news stories in the comments section when they do.
By Adriana Orifici
The High Court has granted the Commonwealth Bank leave to appeal the decision of a majority of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker  FCAFC 83 (Jacobson and Lander JJ, Jessup J dissenting), which recognised that an implied term of mutual trust and confidence (the Implied Term) exists in employment contracts in Australia. In the special leave application, the issues in dispute were described as giving rise to a ‘test case’.
In Australian employment contracts, terms may be implied in fact or in law.
The Implied Term is implied in law and requires that a party to an employment contract will not, without reasonable cause, conduct themselves in a manner likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee. Continue reading
The Supreme Court of Canada, that country’s equivalent to Australia’s High Court, held a hearing this week on the interpretation of its own constituting statute, the Supreme Court Act. Or, to be more precise, some of its judges held that hearing. One of its judges, Nadon J, who was sworn in to the national court last October, did not sit – and, indeed, has never sat – because it is the legality of his appointment that his remaining colleagues must determine. One newspaper has likened the hearing to a tribal council on television’s Survivor.
The legal issue for decision is the statutory qualifications for appointment to the national court. Continue reading
I recently had cause to consult the new ninth edition of ICF Spry’s Equitable Remedies, a tome which I have found very helpful and learned on the topics of specific performance and injunctions in particular. After finding what I needed, I idly browsed through the Preface, as I have difficulty writing Prefaces and I like to see how other authors manage it. However, I do not think I will be taking my Preface-writing tips from Dr Spry. At xi – xii, he criticises the High Court and certain of its judges.
His observations appear to be coloured by the High Court’s decision in Kennon v Spry  HCA 56, where it was decided that Dr Spry would have to pay his ex-wife $2.2 million, and that trust assets were part of the matrimonial property. Indeed, when talking of “eccentric judgments” by the High Court, in footnote 3 on page xi, Dr Spry refers to a judgment of Justice Strickland made in 2005 where he held ‘obviously incorrectly, both that a multilateral release under seal is able to be disregarded unilaterally by the releasor and, moreover, that assets controlled by the releasor in his fiduciary capacity as trustee are to be treated as his personal property.’ Although he does not note it, this was the first instance judgment made in relation to Dr Spry’s family trust which the High Court later upheld. Notoriously, Dr Spry wrote a series of letters to the High Court protesting the decision, letters which he acknowledged had been widely read in the legal profession. Continue reading
By Dr John Waugh
So you don’t want to pay your council rates, or your parking fines? If you live in Victoria, a bit of searching on the internet will provide you with what looks like a great solution: you don’t need to pay, because the Victorian Constitution is invalid. Anything that local councils do under its authority is invalid too. These arguments recently came before the High Court, not for the first time, in Rutledge v Victoria  HCATrans 294 (Hayne J).
Mr Rutledge claimed that he wasn’t bound to pay his rates to the Greater Bendigo City Council, because the creation of the Council wasn’t properly authorised. In effect, the argument was that the Victorian Parliament couldn’t validly establish the Council, because the power it relied on was given by the Constitution Act 1975 (Vic), and that Act was invalid.
Law and mystery
Mr Rutledge had earlier made the same claims in the Victorian Supreme Court, without success. Now he took his case against the State of Victoria and the Greater Bendigo City Council to the High Court. They applied for judgment against him, on the ground that his action was bound to fail.
It’s not hard to see the appeal of arguments like these, at least until you look at the details. Arguments about constitutional validity turn up routinely in the news, and occasionally the courts do indeed overturn Acts of Parliament or government decisions on constitutional grounds. To the ordinary ratepayer, it’s not immediately apparent what the difference is between, on the one hand, arguments that the High Court has accepted in such cases as South Australia v Totani  HCA 39 (the Finks Motorcycle Club case) and Williams v Commonwealth  HCA 23 (the school chaplains case) and, on the other, the arguments put forward in Rutledge and similar cases.
From the outside, constitutional law is often mysterious. The subtle and complex grounds on which challenges succeeded in Totani and Williams seem to hold out the promise that similarly arcane reasoning might succeed in other situations. True, the consequences of accepting the arguments for Mr Rutledge would be sweeping, entailing the invalidity of Victoria’s constitution, but it’s possible to find comparable examples by reaching further back into history. Continue reading
By Adriana Orifici
The High Court’s final decision before the 2013 federal election concerned the highly political area of industrial relations law. The case, Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union v Mammoet Australia Pty Ltd  HCA 36, resulted in a win for the union and striking construction workers. While the then opposition leader was determined to not raise the prospect of industrial reforms during the election campaign, the new Coalition government has since sought to undo industrial initiatives of the past government. This might mean that the High Court’s decision is exposed to legislative reform, with mining lobbyists agitating for the government to bring legislation before parliament to overturn the decision.
In Mammoet the High Court unanimously decided that providing accommodation to striking employees is not a ‘payment’ that is prohibited by s 470(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (Fair Work Act). This decision is significant because it confines the meaning of s 470(1), which prohibits an employer from making ‘a payment’ to an employee taking protected industrial action in relation to the ‘total duration’ of the action on that day. Moreover the effect of the decision is that if an employer fails to provide a striking employee with non-monetary benefits during a period of protected industrial action, this may constitute adverse action under the Fair Work Act or breach of the terms of a relevant industrial instrument. Continue reading
In its final scheduled sitting day for the year, the High Court granted a modest three applications for special leave to appeal lower court decisions involving the dismissal of a senior bank manager, the wrongful disclosure of a compelled examination and a lover’s promise about a burnt-down cottage: Continue reading
Today’s High Court announcements on same-sex marriage, immigration detention and consumer law were doubtless disappointments for some. However, the one body that may be especially disappointed is the Court itself. The Canberra Times reports:
The court handed down its findings in the landmark case about 12.15pm, although a statement announcing the decision was accidentally published on the court’s website about 20 minutes earlier.
While French CJ’s announcement in Courtroom 2, reportedly greeted by silence and sobs, was anticipated by many legal observers, others knew exactly what the Chief Justice would announce. Continue reading
You are cordially invited…:
Please be advised that the High Court will deliver the following judgments in the next week:
Thursday, 12 December 2013 at 12:15 pm in Court No.2 Parkes Place, Canberra
Plaintiff M76/2013 v Minister for Immigration Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship & Ors(M76/2013)
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd(M98/2013)
The Commonwealth of Australia v. The Australian Capital Territory(C13/2013)
The third case is the same-sex marriage case. This announcement (from the High Court’s Judgment Delivery Notification alert service) confirms the ‘hopes’ that French CJ expressed at the end of Tuesday’s hearings. Barring an unlikely retraction, the validity of the ACT’s marriage law will be known on December 12. Indeed, it will be known not too long after 12.15pm that day. The announcement also reveals two further details: the venue and who else is in the order of ceremonies. Continue reading
The Court will reserve its decision. The Court hopes to be in a position to announce a decision on 12 December.
The first sentence means that the Court will not decide the case right away. That is typical in final hearings, although there are exceptions (see here and here.) However, the second sentence is not at all typical. In most cases, no indication is given and the judgment comes when it comes. For example, there was no indication at the May hearing that today’s decision on patents would be the Court’s slowest judgment this year. The Court makes exceptions, though, if knowledge of the timing of the judgment would make a significant difference to someone. For example, at the conclusion of the 2010 hearings on the validity of laws on electoral enrolments, French CJ announced that he hoped that the Court would be in a position to announce a decision the next day, presumably saving the Commonwealth Electoral Commission a lot of money in planning for the contingency of a judgment of invalidity after the rolls had closed.
It is easy to see why the High Court announced a (tentative (UPDATE: see second comment below)) date for judgment in Cth v ACT. As has been widely reported, the announcement immediately resolved whether or not this weekend’s planned weddings in the national capital can go ahead (subject to the distant possibility of a speedier Court decision or the less distant possibility of a Commonwealth application for an injunction.) However, the particular date the Court set is a genuine surprise Continue reading
The class action involving bank fees is back in court again. Last year, the class action against banks was uplifted to the High Court in Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited  HCA 3. It was remitted back down to the Federal Court for decision in light of the High Court’s decision last year and is presently being heard. The case involved the rule against penalties in contract. The essence of the rule is that parties may stipulate the amount payable for certain breaches of contract (known as ‘liquidated damages’), but if the amount payable is not a genuine pre-estimate of loss and is instead in terrorem of the other contracting party (i.e. designed to scare them into performance rather than compensate for loss) then the clause may be struck down by the law against penalties: see Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd  HCA 71; (2005) 224 CLR 656, affirming Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd  AC 79.
There has been intense media interest in the case (see here and here) and indeed, I was contacted by a number of outlets when the case went back to the Federal Court (for example, here and here) . As noted on Monday, there is a great deal of money at stake for both the banks and the customers. The present class action involves a $57 million claim, but other planned class actions are estimated to be worth $243 million, and more may be in the pipeline, depending on the success of this claim. Continue reading
Today was to be the first of two days of hearings of Commonwealth v ACT, the High Court’s first foray into the issue of same-sex marriage. The dispute has been the subject of a number of excellent media pieces explaining the legal issues, most recently a preview on The Conversation by Sydney Law School’s Professor Anne Twomey, including a link to a paper she presented last week on the key statutory provision in the dispute, s. 28 of the ACT (Self-Government) Act 1988. This blog’s case page provides links to coverage of the case on Opinions on High, the transcripts of hearings to date, the Commonwealth’s writ of summons and the High Court’ s own archive of orders and written submissions. Following a recent innovation, the Court will post videos of the hearings on its webpage.
The breaking news today is that the Court has reportedly reserved its judgment after just a single day. While we wait for the transcript of the proceedings, the other news at this stage is about who is involved in the hearing and who isn’t: who is on the bench? who is at the bar? and who is absent? Continue reading
By Anna Chapman
Earlier this month the High Court indicated it was prepared to hear a legal case that tests the ability of intersex Australians to be legally recognised as being neither male or female.
The High Court hearing will be the final decision in a claim initiated in 2010 by NSW resident Norrie, who had applied to the NSW Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages for a certificate to register a change of sex from male to ‘non-specific’.
The evidence before the hearing was that Norrie (who does not use a last name) did not identify as either male or female. Although at birth Norrie’s sex had been recorded as male, as an adult Norrie had undergone medical procedures, and now self-identified — and was identified in the community — as androgynous.
Statutory declarations from Norrie’s doctors supported the registration of a change in sex to ‘non-specific’. The NSW Registrar initially granted Norrie’s application, but this was later revoked.
Norrie appears to be the first person in Australia to litigate for the right to be identified as being of ‘non-specific’ sex. This ground-breaking litigation squarely challenges the capacity of law to countenance sex and gender diversity. Continue reading
On 11 September 2013, leave to appeal was granted in The Go Star v Daebo International Shipping Co Ltd, as noted on our case page. The case involved the charter of a ship, and an allegation that the new charterer had committed the tort of procuring a breach of contract. The appeal to the High Court sought to ascertain what was the lex loci delicti (in other words, the law of the place where the tort was committed). The appellants sought to argue that the relevant law was Chinese law.
However, the High Court has just revoked special leave to appeal on the basis that the case ‘was not a suitable vehicle’ to determine what the lex loci delicti was for the tort of procuring breach of contract. Continue reading
The High Court challenge to the ACT’s Marriage Equality (Same Sex) Act 2013 will be heard next week, beginning on Tuesday 3 December 2013. In advance of the hearing the High Court has published on its website the written submissions of the Commonwealth (the plaintiff) and the ACT (the defendant). Also included on the High Court’s website is a written submission prepared on behalf of the group Australian Marriage Equality Inc. Australian Marriage Equality has applied to be heard as an amicus curiae. Continue reading
By Anna Dziedzic and Sophie Walker
There is only one set of offences under federal law that attracts a mandatory sentence, and perhaps unsurprisingly these offences all relate to people smuggling. Upon conviction of a crime of aggravated people smuggling under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), the sentencing judge must impose a jail term of at least five years. In Magaming v The Queen  HCA 40, six of the seven judges of the High Court upheld the validity of this mandatory sentencing provision under the Australian Constitution. But this is only part of the story. After all, the principal character is Bonang Darius Magaming, a 19 year old Indonesian fisherman who was recruited to steer the boat which carried 52 asylum seekers to Australia. On 6 September 2010, his boat was detained by the Australian Navy near Ashmore Reef. Mr Magaming pleaded guilty to the aggravated offence of smuggling at least five people into Australia. At sentencing, the judge described Mr Magaming as ‘a simple Indonesian fisherman’ and explained that but for the mandatory sentencing provision, he would have imposed a lighter sentence. The judge said:
The seriousness of [Mr Magaming’s] part in the offence therefore falls right at the bottom end of the scale. … In the ordinary course of events, normal sentencing principles would not require a sentence to be imposed as heavy as the mandatory penalties that have been imposed by Federal Parliament. However, I am constrained by the legislation to impose that sentence.
Neither the pleadings, nor the judgment, nor media reports manage to fill in many of the gaps in Mr Magaming’s story. Why did he decide to join the crew? How was his mental and physical health? How did the imposition of a mandatory sentence which the judge considered well beyond the severity of the sentence that would have otherwise been imposed affect him? Continue reading
High Court watchers sometimes speculate that the judges’ willingness to grant special leave varies inversely with their current level of business. Friday’s application hearings show no support at all for that theory.
Having just heard a complex challenge to NSW campaign funding laws and with closely watched expedited hearings on marriage equality and the WA Senate results in the pipeline, the Court granted eight applications for special leave – the highest number in a single day since September 2011 – from the following (highly complex) cases: Continue reading
There was a moment of relative drama at the start of Tuesday’s full court hearing of the challenge by various unions to NSW campaign financing laws. Neil Williams SC, counsel for the Commonwealth (intervening, along with several other states, in support of the NSW laws) told the Court that he needed to draw attention to information that he had just learnt: that a judge of the Court had written an advice that touched on the validity if the NSW law.
The Court adjourned ‘briefly’ to let the parties discuss the issues, but more than that appears to have happened. Continue reading
Monday’s second directions hearing in Cth v ACT fixed a firm date for the full court hearing: 3 and 4 December. That puts the hearing — and perhaps the Court’s orders — ahead of any possible marriages under the yet-to-commence new law’s one-month notice period.
Chief Justice French also settled eight questions for the Court to resolve. Unfortunately, the transcript only reveals the final two, concerning the Court’s ultimate orders and who pays the costs. The rest are contained in an unpublished amended statement of claim lodged by the Commonwealth on 28 October.
Nevertheless, the transcript did reveal two things that won’t be at issue in early December: Continue reading
By Megan Driscoll
Asylum seeker policy has been a polarising subject in Australian politics for more than a decade and it continues to be so with the recently-elected Abbott government attempting to impose its perspective on the political debate on the topic by mandating asylum seekers arriving by boat be referred to as ‘illegal’. Consecutive federal governments have introduced increasingly harsh schemes to deal with the perceived influx of people arriving in Australian territorial waters by boat to seek asylum. The High Court is yet to hear a case challenging the legality of the current arrangement of transferring asylum seekers to Papua New Guinea, Plaintiff S156/2013 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship (transcripts of directions hearings here and here).
Plaintiff M79/2012 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship  HCA 24 (Plaintiff M79) deals with another aspect of the asylum seeker statutory regime: the validity of a temporary safe haven visa granted to a person who had not made an application. In this instance, the Minister granted a temporary safe haven visa to the plaintiff, a Sri Lankan national who arrived by boat on Christmas Island in February 2010 seeking Australia’s protection. The validity of the visa depended on the criteria the High Court determined the Minister was bound to consider when granting the visa, and whether the Minister had addressed those criteria. A majority of the Court found that the sole criterion binding the Minister was whether or not it was in the ‘public interest’ and that it was within the Minister’s discretion to determine what factors were relevant to that interest. Interestingly, Plaintiff M79 could signify that the High Court is beginning to take a more deferential approach to ministerial conduct in deciding to grant or decline visa applications than it has in the recent past, including in the case that rejected the previous government’s so-called ‘Malaysian solution’. Continue reading
By Sarah Mulcahy and Jeannie Marie Paterson
In Google Inc v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission  HCA 1 the High Court held that Google had not engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct contrary to s 52 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA) (now s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL)) in publishing ‘sponsored links’ in response to web page searches. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) argued that Google engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct because its program allowed advertisers to enter the names of competitors as keywords so that a ‘sponsored link’ to the advertiser’s company would arise when the competitor’s name was entered into the search engine. Although the ‘sponsored links’ by the advertisers were misleading or deceptive, Google was held not to be responsible for the misleading or deceptive conduct because it did not author the ‘sponsored links’, nor did it endorse the misleading representations of the advertisers.
However, the decision does not relieve those who control or administer internet sites of liability for misleading or deceptive information posted on those sites. In this case, the links were generated by a computer algorithm over which Google had limited control. But in other situations where an administrator has greater control, it is possible that the administrator may still be liable for the misleading or deceptive conduct of posters or advertisers. Continue reading
Last Friday saw the first ‘directions hearing’ in the Commonwealth’s High Court challenge to the ACT’s recently enacted marriage equality law. While the media focused on French CJ’s indication that the final court hearing — not, as some media suggested, the judgment — may occur in early December, the directions hearing also revealed that the Court may need to resolve some disputes about the role of Australian law in giving effect to the social institution of marriage.
The Commonwealth’s attack on the ACT marriage law centres on its argument that one object of the federal Marriage Act is to ‘address’ a ‘public interest’ in the ‘uniformity of marriage law throughout Australia’. In its statement of claim, it offered six propositions in support of that argument: Continue reading
In all the excitement within segments of the community over the passage of the ACT’s Marriage Equality (Same Sex) Act 2013 (ACT) there has been little critical consideration of the implications of the final changes made to the Bill that were introduced purportedly in order to further protect the laws against a High Court challenge by the Commonwealth government. The implications of those changes will be brought into view when the High Court decides whether to grant leave to appeal Norrie’s case (reported about here) on 8 November 2013. Continue reading
Several media outlets have reported this morning that the Commonwealth yesterday lodged its writ of summons to challenge the validity of the Marriage Equality (Same Sex) Act 2013 (ACT) (ACT Marriage Act), which was passed by the ACT Parliament on Tuesday. The Act as passed is not yet available on the ACT Legislation Registry, but the text of the Bill as originally introduced can be accessed here). The full text of the writ and the Commonwealth’s submissions and related documents for the first directions hearing — which is reportedly scheduled for tomorrow — can be accessed here.
The Commonwealth seeks a declaration by the High Court that the ACT Marriage Act is invalid or, in the alternative, is void. At the first directions hearing, the Commonwealth will submit that the matter should not be remitted to a lower court on the basis that it is a matter of public importance. At a later directions hearing, the Commonwealth will seek a hearing before the Full Court at the earliest possible date. Continue reading
In the wake of the High Court’s video debut last week, Chief Justice Warren of the Supreme Court of Victoria delivered the Redmond Barry Lecture earlier this week, and spoke about a concern that justice is not as transparent and open because of the decline of traditional print media and specialist court reporting. Accordingly, she said that the court would engage with the public through a number of alternative media. The Supreme Court already has a Twitter feed, and has started streaming sentencing remarks. It is also looking to stream criminal trials.
Most interestingly, the court plans to have a blog written by a retired judge ‘to create greater community understanding around controversial issues.’ Continue reading
Last week saw the introduction and speedy passing of some extraordinary Bills in the Queensland parliament. A trio of laws targeting criminal associations follow a widely reported brawl between two bikie gangs outside a Broadbeach restaurant in late September, while a further law targeting sex offenders comes as the Attorney-General appeals against a ruling that same day permitting the release into the community of Robert Fardon, the first man detained as a dangerous sex offender following the expiry of his sentence. Foreshadowing the new bikie gang laws last week, Premier Campbell Newman reportedly told the media:
“We know that some of these things will be challenged… We know that some may be overturned. It doesn’t matter. We are going to continue to try again. There are many mechanisms that we are going to use.”
Indeed, High Court judgments both past and future loom over each law. Continue reading
The seminal third party contract case Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd  HCA 44 was decided twenty five years ago. It continues to be relevant to legal practice and legal education. It has had a lasting and important impact on insurance contracts, as it decided that the doctrine of privity did not apply to those contract. Typically the doctrine of privity means that only the parties to a contract are bound by it, and a person who is not a party to a contract (a ‘third party’) cannot enforce it. For example, suppose that Alphonse makes a contract with Bertha to the effect that Bertha will give Clarence an annuity after Alphonse dies. If Alphonse dies, and Bertha refuses to pay the annuity to Clarence, Clarence can’t force Bertha to keep to the contract because he is not a party to it.
The case also remains a reminder that the High Court will, when presented with the right circumstances, rework the law to achieve a just and fair outcome. In this post I will explore how the decision on the doctrine of privity has become entrenched; and discuss the impact on the decision, in particular the judgment of Deane J on our understanding of the law of express trusts.
What happened in Trident? Continue reading
A month ago, the High Court announced that it would enter the video-publishing business, uploading videos of its Canberra hearings (other than special leave hearings) to its website. On Monday, the Court uploaded its first four videos to a new ’recent AV recordings‘ entry under its webpage‘s ‘cases’ menu. The Court’s prediction that the recordings’ availability would be ‘initially likely to be a few business days after hearings’ was too ambitious; it took eight business days for video for the first eligible hearing (BCM v R, including the bonus issuing of judgments in Bugmy and Munda) to be uploaded. However, the most recent hearing of the session (Karpany v Dietman) took just three business days, confirming its prediction that ‘[t]his delay is likely to be reduced as Court experience grows.’
By Professor Adrienne Stone
Two weeks ago, the Federal Court dismissed a challenge by members of Occupy Melbourne against the enforcement of bans on camping and advertising in inner Melbourne’s squares and gardens. Justice North relied in large part on a High Court ruling from March, concerning Samuel Corneloup and his brother Caleb, members of a street church that regularly engaged in preaching on the Rundle Mall in Adelaide. Their noisy preaching gave rise to one of two important freedom of political communication cases in the High Court this year: Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide  HCA 3 (‘Corneloup’s Case’). (The other, Monis v The Queen  HCA 4, is discussed here.)
Adelaide’s preaching ban
Preaching on the Adelaide mall (like other ‘roads’) is subject to Council By-Law No 4 which (subject to exceptions for election campaigning) provides that ‘[n]o person shall without permission on any road
2.3 preach, canvass, harangue, tout for business or conduct any survey or opinion poll …
2.8 give out or distribute to any bystander or passer-by any handbill, book, notice, or other printed matter.
Disputes arose between the Corneloup brothers and the Adelaide City Council over the Corneloups’ preaching that resulted, first, in the conviction of Samuel Corneloup in the Magistrates Court of South Australia in 2010 and, second, in separate proceedings brought by the Council to restrain the Corneloups and others from preaching on the Rundle Mall. Continue reading
At hearings in Sydney and Canberra today, the High Court granted special leave to four new cases (in contrast to six new cases at each its previous two sessions.) Two of the cases – both particularly interesting ones, in my view – are appeals from the Northern Territory Supreme Court. It’s been over three-and-a-half years since the High Court last granted leave to a Northern Territory case. The Court typically averages a little under one case a year from that jurisdiction.
The four special leave grants are for appeals from the following decisions: Continue reading
The High Court today released its highly-anticipated judgment in Bugmy v The Queen, HCA 37, previewed here, examining the so-called Fernando principles concerning the sentencing of indigenous Australians. The defendant, William David Bugmy, succeeded in his appeal. However, as is often the case with High Court judgments, the true significance of the case is harder to parse.The Court didn’t restore Bugmy’s original (lower) sentence, but rather told the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal to reconsider the Crown’s criticism of that sentence afresh. More importantly, the Court rejected both the Court of Criminal Appeal’s interpretation of the Fernando principles and a number of suggested refinements of those principles proposed by Bugmy.
The case has generated interest online, captured in discussions on social media. Immediate reactions on Twitter fell into two camps. Continue reading
By Martin Clark
On Friday 13 September 2013 I was lucky enough to spend an hour interviewing Professor William Gummow AC about his time on the High Court of Australia (1995–2012).
Professor William Gummow AC retired in October 2012 from the High Court after 17 years on the bench. Prior to that he sat on the Federal Court for ten years, and before that had been an influential and highly-regarded member of the Sydney Bar, a partner at Allen Allen and Hemsley, and also lectured part-time at the Sydney Law School from 1965 until 1995. He is now Professor of Law at the Sydney Law School and the Australian National University.
In this extensive interview, Professor Gummow discusses a wide range of topics, including the similarities and differences between the judges and processes of the High Court of Australia and other apex courts around the world, his views on advocacy before the High Court, and changes in the legal profession. He also offers his thoughts on the enduring importance of several great Australian judges, including Sir Owen Dixon, Sir Victor Windeyer, Sir Garfield Barwick and Sir Nigel Bowen. Continue reading
Over the weekend ABC’s Landline broadcast a story about the circumstances leading to the closure of a rural Victorian abattoir, in particular the role of the State authority PrimeSafe and the economic harm caused by the closure to small agribusinesses in the surrounding district. The premise for closing the abattoir was that animals were being treated cruelly. However, cruelty was never proven against the business. I was asked to offer a view about the potential causes of action that the Giles family that owned the abattoir might have against PrimeSafe to recover losses arising from their lost business.
By Laureate Professor Cheryl Saunders AO
The latest proposal to amend the Commonwealth Constitution to ‘recognise’ local government may go down in history as one of the most inept attempts at constitutional change in Australia. Insofar as it has an indirect link to the decisions of the High Court in Pape v Commissioner of Taxation  HCA 23 and Williams v Commonwealth  HCA 23 it merits a post on Opinions on High. In any event, there are lessons to be drawn from the history of this proposal, as a guide to the formulation and conduct of future referendum proposals.
Constitution Alteration (Local Government) 2013 (Cth) passed both Houses of the Commonwealth Parliament on 24 June 2013. The impetus for it derived from a long-held desire on the part of local government to be recognised in the Commonwealth Constitution as the third arm of Australian government. This project is fraught because recognition almost inevitably involves substantive change of some kind in the operation of the Australian federation, in which the relations between the other two arms of government already is under strain. A proposal cast in terms of symbolic recognition was rejected at referendum in 1988. An earlier proposal to establish a direct financial relationship between the Commonwealth and local government was rejected in 1974 (see here). Continue reading